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Germany as well as South Africa have established Constitutional Courts. 
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, located in Karlsruhe (cf § 1 II 
BVerfGG), commenced its work in September 1951. Up to 1995 the Federal 
Constitutional Court heard more than 120,000 cases1 . 
The South African Constitutional Court was established in 1994 in terms of the 
country's first democratic constitution - the interim Constitution of 1993. In terms 
of the 1996 Constitution the Court established under the interim tonstitution 
continued to hold office. The Court, situated in Johannesburg, began its first 
sessions in February 19952. 
In its first year of operation, the Constitutional Court heard 22 cases and gave 
judgement in 14. By December 1996 it had decided a total of about 40 cases3 . 
Constitutional Courts are called upon to prevent the state from violating the 
constitution. Since Germany and South Africa are constitutional states by now, the 
constitutions are their supreme law (Art.20 III GG respectively s.1 (c) of the SA­
Constitution). It means inter alia, that all laws and executive actions have to 
comply with the requirements laid down in the Constitution 4. 
In cases where this does not happen, the courts and the Constitutional Courts in 
I 
particular will provide the necessary "judicial remedies". 
In the final 
5
instance the Constitutional Courts are thus the guardiarfpf the/' 
jConstitution . The Constitutional Courts are supposed to ensure that state 
institutions act only �s they are requireato d�- in accordance with the constitution 
- by controlling all their activities6 Thus, the Courts' highly responsible task is 
. 
only one part of the whole functioning of the state organisation and requires co-
1 Wohrmann, p.22 
2 Constitutional Court's Homepage 
3 Sarkin, p.135 
i4 
Kotze, p.19 
5 BVerGE 6, 300 (304); Wohnnann, p.7; Devenish, p.220; Kotze, p.19; 
Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature, & others v President of South Africa & others 
1993110} BCLR 1289 (CC'),�at.:p�a=ra:.1;,;2·2,,---------------
--
6 Brinkmann, p.87 
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operation with these other organs of state 7. On the other hand, they need sufficient 
independence from and sufficient authority over the institutions they are supposed 
to control. Were these institutions enabled to interfere in any way, the 
safeguarding of the constitution would not be effective. 
Hence, the Constitutional Courts at the same time require and safeguard the 
separation of powers. 
However, the division-of-powers principle implies not only the distinction between 
legislative, executive and judicial functions and their allocation to specific organs 
(separation of powers) but also mutual checks and curbs of those organs (balance 
of powers) to prevent the branches of government from usurping power from one 
another. In this sense it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of one 
branch on the terrain of another8. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Courts are enabled to supervise every activity of 
all state organs: 
1. All organs of the state are controlled regarding the strict observance of their
competence.
2. The legislature 
 
is controlled with the effect that a statute can be annulled.  
3. The executive is controlled with the effect that a governmental action or any
administrative action can be abolished when incompatible with the constitution.
4. The judicial power of all :dina�tou;(� i�ntrolled with the effect that any
judgement can be abolished due to its unconstitutional result9.
That puts them in a way in a position above all the other states' organs and in
tension with the division-of-powers-principle; the Constitutional Court might
transform itself from a guardian of the Constitution to the master of the
Constitution10 . Indeed, no constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation
of powers: the scheme is always one of partial separation 11.
Rupp- v.Briinneck, p.401 
8 Wohrmann, p.6; 
In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1996 10 BCLR 
1253 (CC) 
9 Doehring, p.22 
10 Lamprecht/ Malanowski, p.11 
11 In re: Ce�Q.Q(Jhe_Co�titution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1996 10 BCLR 
1253 (CC) 
However, although the legislature has the primary legislative powers, those 
powers are not exclusive, since the courts play a secondary legislative role12. All 
the same the Constitutional Courts of both countries as the guardians of the 
constitutional values are certainly not allowed to take over the constitutional role 
of the legislature13. In Germany the criticism went even so far to call the L-- °"
Constitutional Court the "Third Legislative Chamber", "Negative Legislator" or 
"Superlegislator"14.
/ 
In any case, constitutional jurisdiction presents a problem to the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, in distinguishing it from the democratically legitimised 
 
Not only as secondary legislator the Constitutional Courts are inevitably in tension between law and 
politics.In theory, the function of a court is only to uphold the law and not to interfere in 
politics. This supposedly neutral position, however, does not mean that the 
Constitutional Courts would be kept outside politics, since in the background of 
every constitutional controversy there stands a political problem which may 
develop into a question of power16; in the sphere of constitutional law a political 
question becomes the object of a legal controversy and decision 17. 
Besides tha;constitutional law is by its very nature political law
18
: with its broad 
general clauses and its vague conceptions of values, it offers a particularly wide 
scope for interpretation. Any wish to keep political considerations out of this 
interpretation would be doomed to failure from the outset. It is obvious that 
concepts such as freedom and equality, the dignity of man and personality, among 
many others, cannot be interpreted without recourse to the social and political 
ideas of the contemporary body of law19.
12 Botha, p.116 
13 Botha, p.118 
14 Brinkmann p.83, 89 with further references 
15 Brinkmann, p.89 
16 Brinkmann, p.87 
17 Leibholz, p.273 
18 Brinkmann, p.83 
19 Bachof, p.409 
Not even the most precise regulatiofi$,of the procedures and competenciesfenc~ 
~rre able to prevent, that the decisions of Constitutional Courts have a more 
political impact than the decisions of other courts20 . 
Apart from that political struggles are shifted to the courts for resolution. Use and 
threatened use of the courts to solve political conflict have already occurred in 
/ 
~ffi Africa as well as in Germany, political parties may use the courts to fight 
\./their political battles21 . It is equally the political parties and governmental 
institutions which attempt to circumvent and obstruct the democratic process by 
clothing highly political questions in a legalistic form, so laying the groundwork 
for the judicialisation of politics22. 
Thus, the Constitutional Courts play a highly responsible role in the structure of 
the states not only as courts but also as political instruments. Furthermore, in 
order to fulfil their function as guardians of the constitutions they are vested with 
extraordinary powers. The combination of both suggests an enormous influence 
on the states' ruling. 
This work will try to find out whether, and if, how the conceptions of the courts 
took into account the tensions between the states' powers and politics. In 
comparing the German and the South African conception the implications of 
different means will be considered. For that the work at first monitors the courts 
as institutions. All the same, not only the design of the courts determines the 
courts' significance. To a very considerable extent it also depends on the judges 
giving the decisions and judgements. Therefore the role of the judges will be taken 
into consideration as well. 
In the end it might be possible to conclude and evaluate how the courts are 
integrated in the states' structure. 
II. The Courts as Institutions 
In this chapter it shall be examined what kind of institutions the Constitutional 
Courts of Germany and South Africa actually are. The Courts' authority depends 
substantially, besides their reputation, on their design. The Constitutional Courts' 
20 Pestalozza, p. l 
21 Sarkin, p.135 
22 Brinkmann, p.103 
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design means their legal framework, their status, and their internal structure. 
These aspects determine, whether the courts can comply with their task to 
safeguard the constitutions on the one hand, but do not have a position which is 
impossible to integrate in a balanced state�structure on the other. L---
A. The Legal Framework
The legal framework of the courts�-0rmed by the laws and statutes which t, IS 
govern the courts' conduct of work. The legal framework is the overall­
determination of the courts' power. In both states the legal framework is provided 
for in different bodies of law: 
The German as well as the South African court are provided for in the 
constitutions of the respective states. However, additional to the constitutional  
. 
provisions, the parliaments have passed laws dealing with the courts specifically.
In Germany it is the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVertDG), in South Africa
 the Constitutional Court Complementary Act, 1995 (CCCA). Furthermore both  
' 
courts are authorised by means of law (§ 1 III BVerfGG respectively s.16 CCCA) ·
to adopt rules prescribing their internal matters. 
Accordingly the German Court established the Geschaftsordnung fii.r das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (GOBVerfG), the South African court has got the 
Constitutional Court Rules, 1998 (CCR), which supersede the Constitutional 
Court Rules, 1995. 
1 
Not only the content of the provisions dealing with the Constitutional Court 
determinc&the range of the courts' powers. Notwithstanding, it also matters to 
which body of law the provisions are allocated, since they all have divergent 
general significance and accordingly divergent implications for the courts as 
institutions. 
1. The Significance of the Different Regulations
Each of these three bodies of law ar�passed by different organs. These organs L- l � 
differ in their consistence, their dependence on and responsibility to the state and 
the people, and their attitude towards the courts. Furthermore, the possibilities of 
amendments differ between these bodies oflaw. 
a) The Role of Constitutional Provisions
7 
The Constitutions were passed by the Parlamentarischer Rat (i.e. Parliamentary
Council) in Germany and the Constitutional Assembly in South Africa. Both 
·organs were established only to construct a constitution and were not dependent 
on any later election, party discipline or polls. They exclusively had the task to 
create a constitution for their states, which does not serve any particular interest 
but only for the sake of a stable democracy. Therefore it lay in the hands of these 
organs' members to balance the powers of the state. Their provisions are meant to 
furnish the Constitutional Courts with the appropriate power which is compatible 
with the other powers of state. Hence, the more exact the constitutional provisions 
are, the more the Constitutional Court's power is presumably balanced against the 
other state's powers.
As amendments of constitutional provisions need qualified majorities and particular 
proceedings in Germany as well as in South Africa (Art. 79 GG respectively s.74 of 
the SA-Constitution), it is furthermore rather unlikely that the Constitutional 
Courts' powers will be too far extended. Thus, all provisions dealing with the 
Constitutional Court are their essentials, which are supposed to remain unchanged.
b) The Role of Legislative Provisions
The legislative provisions dealing with the constitutional courts lie in the 
responsibility of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat;and the South African
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. These are elected 
bodies, which are mainly party based. Consequently the major party or ruling 
coalition is able to shape the Constitutional Court according to their ideas in 
between the scope the Constitution sets out. Therefore it is important to what 
extent the constitution delegates legislative power dealing with the Constitutional 
Court to the parliaments. If the legislature's power is as broad as to be able to 
undermine the authority of the Constitutional Court, the independence then is not 
sufficient and the Courts' function at stake: as the courts' task is to control inter 
( 
alia the parliaments' activity there could be a government once who would try to 
diminish the Constitutional Courts' ability to function accordingly. 
, However, the more the constitutio�s regulat)the more limited is the scope for the
\ major part)i') 
alternatively the ruling coalition to influence the Constitutional Court.
� J  
'
As these regulations are matters of ordinary legislation, they are likewise subject 
to amendments. In concrete it means that the legislature may attempt to curb the 
Court's powerswhen itppposes a decision of the Constitutional Court . 
..ot.. ~ Thus, th;e Constitutional Courts' authority and independence cannot be evaluated 
without cqnsidering the scope of parliamentarian legislation. 
c) The Role of Provisions of the Courts' Self-
Governing 
The scope of the self-governing power of the courts is dependent on the 
regulations of the aforementioned laws. The Courts can only regulate matters 
which are not provided for by neither the constitutions nor parliamentarian 
legislation provide. The remaining gaps of legislation are supposed to be filled by 
provisions passed and amended by members of the Courts. Most probably these 
provisions will serve the interests of the Court at first. Thus, in general a broad 
scope of self-government brings the Court in a stronger position as a small scope. 
After showing the implications of the different bodies of law on the Constitutional 
Courts' authority, it shall be taken into closer consideration, which matters were 
regarded as that substantial to provide for constitutionally, which were delegated 
to the legislature and which remain in the Courts' own sphere. 
2. The Particular Constitutional Provisions 
Both constitutions require the existence of a Constitutional Court and set out 
something about the composition. Furthermore both Constitutions are providing -for the Courts' jurisdiction. For regulating further aspects and details, the 
Constitutions empower the legislatures (respectively the Court itself) accordingly. 
a) Constitutional Establishment of the Courts 
Indeed the Constitutions provide for the existence of a Constitutional Court. 
The ninth chapter of the German Grundgesetz (GG, i.e. Basic Law) is dealing with 
the 'J\.dministration of Justice''. Within this chapter the legal basis for the Federal 
Constitutional Court is provided by Art.92-94, 99, 100 and 115 (g) and (h) GG. 
The South African Constitution also contains a specific chapter, the eighth, titled, 
much alike the German one, 'The Courts and the Administration of Justice". 
9 
''( 
S.166 of the SA-Constitution declares the existence of five different categories of 
courts. Here the existence of a Constitutional Court is provided for. 
Whether or not the Constitutions actually establish a Constitutional Court, is in 
fact questionable, as the establishment requires certain prerequisites. 
Indeed, the Grundgesetz of 1949 had provided the existence of such a court and 
transfers some certain jurisdictional tasks to the Federal Constitutional Court in 
Art.93 I GG23 . However, the actual establishment is required to be provided by 
federal legislation. Art.94 II GG instructs the legislature to pass a federal law24, 
which sets out the constitution and the procedures of the Federal Constitutional 
Court. Without such a law a constitutional court could neither exist nor be legally 
claimed and irnposed25 . 
Though, in contrast to the German Grundgesetz the South African Constitution 
also contains a provision, which actually constitutes the Constitutional Court. 
S.167 (1) of the SA-Constitution determines the composition of the court, and 
subsec.2 even sets out a quorum of how many judges must hear a matter before --, 
the Constitutional Court. 
These basic regulations make it possible to enforce at least the mere existence of a 
constitutional court in South Africa. 
Hence, a law in terms of national legislation just to establish a constitutional court, 
is not needed in South Africa. In Germany on the other hand the establishment of 
the Constitutional Court needed legislative participation. This participation caused 
a delay ~f the Court's corning into being: It took almost two additional years of 
debate to pass the German 'Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz" (BVerfGG) which 
actually created the Constitutional Court26 . 
b) Constitutional Dealing with the Courts' 
' 
\V'L ~s ? ti-r 'b 
Composition 
Here it shall be investigated what the Constitutions provide for the Courts' 
consistence and structure. 
23 v.Miinch - Meyer, art.94 s.no.4 
24 v.Mi.inch - Meyer, art.94 s.no.4 
25 v.Mi.inch - Meyer, art.94 s.no.4 
26 Robbers, s.no.10; Kommers, p.11 
The Grundgesetz does not provide for the composition of the Constitutional Court 
in detail. Only in Art.94 I GG is set out, that some of the constitutional judges 
must be federal judges. 
"Federal judges" are the judges who are firmly employed by one of the supreme 
federal courts27 (Federal High Court, Federal Administrative Court, Federal 
Labour Court, Federal Social Court and Federal Tax Court). The other members 
of the Federal Constitutional Court are ordinary judges of other courts
28
. 
The Grundgesetz does not provide for a specific number of judges. However, the 
second sentence of Art.94 I GG states that the Bundestag as well as the Bundesrat 
shall each elect half of the members of the Constitutional Court. From that one can 
conclude that it must be an even number of judges. Thus, only a basic condition is 
determined by the Grundgesetz, it leaves open the regulation of the actual 
proceedings. 
In that regard the South African Constitution is more comprehensive. 
The first two subsections of s.167 of the SA-Constitution determine, that the 
Constitutional Court shall consist of eleven judges, and that at least eight of them 
must hear the cases brought before the Court. 
Furthennore, the South African Constitution deals quite in detail with the 
appointment of judicial officers and their conditions. The proceeding of the 
appointment of the President, the Deputy President and the other judges of the 
Constitutional Court is exhaustively prescribed by s.174 (3) and (4) of the SA-
Constitution and s.176 (1) of the SA-Constitution determines the judges' tenn of  office. 
However, there is no provision setting out any incompatibilities with other 
functions the judges might have, whereas the German Grundgesetz is concerned 
about the judges independence and therefore states that they cannot be members 
of the Bundestag, Bundesrat, the Federal Government or any corresponding 
institution of a Land concurrently ( cf. Art.94 I GG). 
Hence, the Grundgesetz provides indeed for certain important criteria but the 
,_ 
composition relies also to a certain degree on the legislature. The South African 
Constitution, in contrast, prescribes the composition of the Court very exactly; 
further regulations in this respect are not necessary. 
27 v.Miinch - Meyer, art. 94 s.no.11
28 
v.Miinch - Meyer, art.94 s.no.12
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c) Constitutional Assignment of Jurisdiction 
ro i--1 ~~ cer 
Of particular interest is of course, which competencies are constitutionally 
assigned to the courts and in what way. Jurisdiction is the power or competence of 
a court to adjudicate upon, determine and dispose a matter29. 
Nearly all of the Constitutional Court's powers are laid down in ten different 
articles of the German Grundgesetz3°, most of the Court's jurisdictional tasks are 
transferred by Art.93 I GG3~here is not an overall clause which would 
authorise the court universally to pass decisions in disputes regarding 
constitutional law32. Instead the allocation of competencies to the Constitutional 
__..:.--
Court follows the so-called enumeration principle. It means that the Court's 
competencies are not outlined by means of a general clause, but each proceeding 
is particularly set out by law33 . 
Art.93 I Nr. l-4b GG forms the main catalogue, and Art.93 I Nr.5 GG refers to the 
other nine articles of the Grundgesetz, where further assignments of competence 
to the Constitutional Court are to be found. However, Art. 93 II GG also grants 
the possibility that federal legislation might provide for other cases to be heard and 
decided by this Court. 
From these constitutional provisions it results that the Constitutional Court is a 
specialised tribunal empowered to decide only constitutional questions and a 
limited set of public-law controversies (Its non-constitutional jurisdiction is 
confined largely to conflicts between levels of government and to certain disputes 
arising under international law)34. The fjnal and exclusive jurisdiction over 
W 1t.71i 
constitutional matters always liel§Jhe Federal Constitutional Court35 . Hence, to 
a very considerable extent the court exclusively determines the interpretation of 
the Grundgesetz36 . 
29 de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p.75 
3° Kommers, p.11 
31 v.Miinch - Meyer, art.94 s.no.4 
32 Wohrmann, p.9 
33 Pestalozza, p.234 
34 Kommers, p.3 
35 Wohrmann, p. 7 
36 Brinkmann, p.83 
12 
Such an exclusiveness does not apply for the South African Constitutional Court. 
The South African way of allocating jurisdiction to its Constitutional Court 
compared to the German is utterly different. 
For instance, the South African Constitution provides in s.172 (1) (a) of the SA-
Constitution that every court, if it discovers an inconsistency with the Constitution 
within its power, must declare the law or the conduct at hand invalid. In contrast 
to that Art. I 00 GG expressly determines that if a court considers a law, which is 
decisive for the pending case, incompatible with the constitution, it must seek a 
ruling of the Constitutional Court. 
S.167 (4) and (5) of the SA-Constitution set out some certain cases which are 
exclusively in the Constitutional Court's competence. However, this catalogue is 
not comprehensive. S.167 (3) of the SA-Constitution confines the court's 
jurisdiction to constitutional matters, and issues connected with decisions on 
constitutional matters. Anyhow, the legal term "constitutional matters" is 
completely indefinite, and the extension on "issues connected with decisions on 
constitutional matters" even broadens the scope of application. This general clause 
is scarcely specified by the brief definition in s.167 (7) of the SA-Constitution. 
This general clause still needs interpretation for application. The final decision 
about the interpretation is given to the Court itself in terms of s.167 (3) ( c) of the 
SA-Constitution 37. ------
That leads to the suggestion that the court is in charge for matters other than 
those mentioned in s.167 (4) and (5) of the SA-Constitution. This appears to 
broaden the court's power immensely, because it is up to the Court to decide 
which cases are to be dealt with. In terms of these provisions the court can 
determine the scope of its competence to a great extent by itself 
d) Constitutional Delegation to Legislate 
Both Constitutions, the German as well as the South African one, leave open 
some important issues for the Constitutional Courts' functioning. Therefore they 
contain some delegation-clauses which empower respectively instruct other 
institutions to pass according regulation. 
37 Devenish, p.223 
13 
Art.94 II GG is such a clause. It instructs the legislator to pass a federal law which 
specifies the cases in which the Federal Constitutional Court's decisions have the 
force of law. Besides that Art.94 II GG allows the legislator that such law may 
make a complaint of unconstitutionality conditional upon the exhaustion of all 
other legal remedies and provide for a specific admissibility procedure. This 
provision also implicates that a full discretion to decide upon applications by the 
Constitutional Court itself would not be compatible38  It has to be the legislator 
.
who determines the conditions of admissibility. 
However, similar to the German regulation, the SA-Constitution also requires 
national legislation for the functioning of the Constitutional Court (s.171 of the 
SA-Constitution) and instructs the national legislator to pass a law providing the 
rules and procedures inter alia of the Constitutional Court. S.171 of the SA­
Constitution does not further specify the matters which shall be governed by the 
law of national legislation. There is for instance no constitutional order to provide 
for the competence more precisely. 
The only condition for the delegated law is set out in terms of s.167 ( 6) of the SA­
Constitution. In contrast to the German ruling s.167 (6) of the SA-Constitution 
requires a provision ( either in terms of national legislation or by means of rules in 
the inherent power of the court) which allows direct access to the Constitutional 
Court and direct appeal from any other court39. Though, apart from that, s.173 of 
the SA-Constitution grants (inter alia) to the Constitutional Court "the inherent 
power to protect and regulate" its own process. Ultimately it means, that the 
South African Court not only can determine its own jurisdiction, but also the 
admissibility of access. 
Insofar, the South African Constitutional Court is, at least constitutionally, 
considerably less influenced or may be even restricted by the legislature than the 
German Court. 3. The Matters Dealt With by the Legislative Law
At this stage it shall be taken into consideration in what areas the legislators have 
exercised their power and influenced the Constitutional Courts. 




After almost two years of debate the German 'Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz" 
(BVerfGG, i.e. Law on the Federal Constitutional Court) was passed, required in 
Art.94 II GG. First of all it actually created the Federal Constitutional Court40 . 
The first part of the Bundesverjassungsgerichtsgesetz declares the Court's 
independence and its seat (§ 1 I respectively II BVerfGG) and establishes two 
panels of eight judges and their composition(§ 2 I respectively II BVerfGG). § 3 
BVerfGG repeats the prerequisites for the judges to become a member of the 
Constitutional Court and adds, that any other professional occupation is precluded 
( save that of a lecturer of law). It was contended that the legislator had 
overstepped its powers with that provision, as in this regard the Grundgesetz were 
exhaustive. However, by now it is unanimous that this provision makes sense. 
The second part sets out general procedural rules, such as representation of the 
parties of the case (§22 I BVerfGG), written applications for the institution of 
proceedings(§ 23 I BVerfGG) or oral pleadings(§ 25 I BVerfGG) for example. 
Whereas the Grundgesetz in Art.93 just enumerates the cases in the competence 
of the Federal Constitutional Court comprehensively41 , the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz codifies the cases provided by Art.93 GG42 . 
According to Art.94 II GG it contains in its third part specific procedural 
provisions for all mentioned cases of Art. 93 GG. Just the number of provisions 
(§§ 36 -96 BVerfGG) indicates that the law regulates all the procedures exactly
and differently. The BVerfGG provides for 15 different procedures before the 
Constitutional Court, all listed in§ 13 BVerfGG43 . 
After all it is obvious that the German legislator not only created the 
Constitutional Court by means of the BVerfGG, but also exercised severe 
influence on the procedure before the Court. Indeed, the legislature was · 
constitutionally obliged to pass a corresponding law. Anyhow, a broad discretion 
remained, in what way the Bundestag and Bundesrat actually convert their 
obligation: The legislator could have chosen to regulate these issues by means of 
general clauses or just brief descriptions for instance. 
40 
Robbers, s.no.10; Kommers, p.11 





The South African legislature, in comparison, confined itself to some basic 
provisions and passed the Constitutional Court Complementary Act, 1995 
(CCCA). This Act shall "regulate matters incidental to the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and 
matters connected therewit� as the preamble sets out. As the Constitution has 
already established the Constitutional Court, the Act is not concerned with that. It 
indeed contains some re,!P.arkable_provisions, inter alia, lik0 (1) CCCA, which  
establishes civil immunity for the members of the Constitutional Court, or s.14 
CCCA, which delegates the fundamental power to appoint officers and staff to the 
President of the Court and the Minister of Justice. 
Furthermore s.15 CCCA determines that those expenditures in connection with 
the administration and the functioning of the Court shall be defrayed from moneys 
appropriated by parliament, addressed to Parliament by the Minister of Justice. 
Nonetheless, the is no legislative provision for any specific procedures; thus, the 
power to regulate the proceedings remains at the Court itself 
That is in any case a great difference to the German legal framework. The Federal 
Constitutional Court's power to regulate its own internal affairs does not 
encompass the competence to provide for the procedurJS. In Germany it is the 
Parliament who determines how the Court has to rule the cases before it. 
4. The Self-Government of the Constitutional Courts
The Courts' self-government results in regulations passed by themselves. Their 
scope is also a parameter which indicates the significance of the Courts as 
institutions. 
The Federal Constitutional Court's internal affairs are governed by the 
Geschiiftsordnung fur das Bundesverfassungsgericht (GOBVerfG). By 
authorization of§ 1 III BVerfGG the GOBVerfG is adopted by the plenum of the 
Court's members. As an interpretation of 'internal affaiWclearly shows, the 
GOBVerfG' s scope is restricted- to organisational matters and the administration 
of the court without external �ffect, whereas some of the corresponding South 
�can Constirutional Court Rules, 1998 (CCCR 1998) have in fact external 
effect. 
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The Court's constitutionally assigned 'inherent power" to 'protect" and 
'regulate" its process certainly affects all applicants and parties of cases. By 
,( 
authorisation of s.16 CCCA the President of the South African Constitutional 
Court in consultation with the Chief Justice regulated matters relating to the 
proceedings of and before court (Preamble of the CCCA). Though, the 
Constitutional Court itself stated, that this power has to be exercised with caution 
and by taking into account the interests of justice. Furthermore the exercise must 
be in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution and as far as possible 
with the procedures ordinarily followed by the Court in similar cases 44.
The most important rules in regard to the Court's power are No.13 - 20 CCR. 
They set· out the prerequisites for altogether seven different procedures similar to 
the German BVerfGG. However, as easily recognisable by just considering the 
number of seven in South Africa versus 15 different procedures in Germany, the 
procedures in South Africa are either not as differentiated as in Germany or the 
South African Constitutional Court has less competencies. That will be subject to 
later investigation. 
At this stage, anyhow, the conclusion can be drawn that the German 
Constitutional Court in this regard is considerably more dependent on the 
legislature than the South African Court. 
The status of the Courts' means their legally assigned position in the structure of 
the state as well as their relation to other institutions of the state. 
In keeping with their function as the supreme guardian of the constitution, the 
Constitutional Courts have a prominent positiori in the structure of the state 45. 
The German Court is at the same time a court and a supreme constitutional 
organ46 . 
Constitutional organs are supreme bodies directly established under the 
Grundgesetz performing essential functions: the legislative bodies Bundestag and 
Bundesrat, the Federal President, the Federal Government and, in fact, the Federal 
44 
S v Pennigton and Another 1997 (10) BCLR 1413 (CC), para.22 A, 23 D 
45 Bottcher/ Umbach, § 1 s.no.8 
46 
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Constitutional Court47 . Insofar this Court is regarded on an equal footing with the 
other mentioned organs set up under the Grundgesetz48, consequently it belongs 
to the state-leading organs49. v . 
§ 1 I BVerfGG provides that the Federal Constitutional Court is separate and
independent from all other constitutional organs. Therefore the Federal
Constitutional Court is not attached to a particular ministry (for example, the
Federal Ministry of Justice)5° and has its own budget which the court administers
autonomously51 : The Federal Constitutional Court draws up its own budget which
\._..,�s as a separate item in the Federal Budget and manages its funds itself 2.
Additionally the German Federal Constitutional Court is a true court53 : It does not 
act ex officio put only when called upon by ari authorised party and it decides  
upon questions oflaw in an independent capacity54 . Thus, the Constitutional Court belongs 
to the judicial power. This is also confirmed by Art.92 GG, that states that 
the Constitutional Court is one of the courts which shall exercise the judicial 
power. Though, as the court underlined itself, the constitutional status of the 
Constitutional Court is different from the other federal courts55, it is detached 
from the remaining court structure. It is not the last stage of appeal in a sequence 
of courts. It is rather a court of first and final instance. By virtue of the substance 
and impact of the decisions it is the head of the federal judiciary56.
The status of the South African Constitutional Court differs from the status of the 
German one. 
Indeed the South African Constitutional Court functions as a court as well. S.166 
in combination with s.165 (1) of the SA-Constitution assigns the judicial authority 
inter alia to the Constitutional Court. Thus, there is no doubt that the Court 
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S.167 (3)(a) of the SA-Constitution confirms its status as the highest court in all
constitutional matters. 
However, the Constitutional Court is not only the highest court in constitutional 
matters, but also manifestly intended to be the most esteemed court in the land57 . 
Like the German one, the South African Constitutional Court ha� Republic-wide 
jurisdiction58 . As the ultimate guardian of the supreme law of the Republic, the 
Constitutio� to which all state organs are bound, the Constitutional Court can
interfere with all their actions and conduct. That gives the Court the prominent 
position in the judiciary. This is underlined by s.167 of the SA-Constitution, which 
presents the categories of courts in order of their rank in the judicial hierarchy59 . 
The Constitutional Court is the first one named and accordingly is the highest 
court in South Africa. 
Notwithstanding 'its supreme position, the Constitutional Court is not detached 
from the remaining court structure like the German Court. 
By empowering the Supreme Court of Appeal and any High Court to decide on 
the validity of a parliamentary or provincial statute or any conduct of the 
President, the Constitutional Court from a conceptual and procedural point of 
view is increasingly positioned as an appellate court60 . Only in very few and 
exceptional cases will the Constitutional Court hear a matter at first instance61 .
Besides that the Constitutional Court is closely linked to the Department of Justice 
and does not manage its funds autonomously, although Principle VII of the interim 
Constitution had required to give an appropriate qualified, independent and 
impartial judiciary the power and jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the 
Constitution. This in effect means that the judiciary must be endowed with original 
constitutional competence, thus elevating it to the status of an autonomous organ 
of the state 62. In fact s.239 (2) of the SA-Constitution declares that courts cannot
be seen as 'brgans of state". However, the wording 'tlespite subsection (1 )" 
indicates that the courts actually fall under the legal definition ef s.239 (1) of the 
57 
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SA-Constitution and are indeed institutions which exercise power and perform 
function in terms of the Constitution respectively any other legislation 63.
Principle VII of the interim Constitution also implies that the judiciary may in no 
way be made subject to undue interference by legislatures, executives and 
-
5
courts to dispose over their own separate budgets64.
administrations, and may even require provision for 
 
at least the highest court or  
1 
1 
C . . l C . . al h' h h I d' 
Consequently, by assigning the Constitutional Court a position as an appellate 
court under the authority of the Department of Justice the South African Court  
has a lower status than the German Court and is institutionally not as independent 
as the Federal Constitutional Court. Hence, one cannot define the South African 
onst1tut1ona ourt as a supreme constitution organ w 1c as state- ea mg
I. • � O'la�'S,il>iJ or 
functions. 
-----
C The Internal Structure 
To evaluate the actual power of a Constitutional Court, an important factor is the 
internal structure, or, one couid also say, the "equipping" of the Court. Whether 
the Constitutional Courts in both countries can actually cope with their aims, 
basically depends on the budgets available for the Courts. Certainly it is impossible 
to compare the German and the South African Constitutional Court in this regard 
directly, not only because of the different economic conditions of the countries. It 
also has to be taken into account, that the personnel, financial and other needs of 
. 
,· i,.,, 0such an institution depends on the duties which have to be fulfilled� the • l 
competencies of the Courts, as well as the actual dem�ne number of cases 
brought before the court. 
Whether the financial equipping of the Courts is sufficient, cannot be evaluated 
comprehensively in this context. 
However, the internal structure will be at least monitored by considering the 
organisation of the courts. It relates to their staff and the allocation of business. 
63 other opinion: Pienaar, p.27 
64 Venter, p.41 
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The German Constitutional Court consists of two panels of eight judges ( § 2 I, II 
BVerlGG). Both so-called senates are equal in rank and rights65, therefore the 
Federal Constitutional Court is considered as a twin-court66 . 
According to § 2 III BVerfGG three federal judges have to be in each senate; the 
other five are the so-called 'bther members''. All the judges are appointed to only 
one of the two senates67 . 
Both panels have separate competencies and are completely independent of one 
another; within the scope of its competence each panel is "the Federal 
Constitutional Court". The independence is also reflected by the fact that each 
judge is elected to one panel only; a judge from the other panel may, on principle, 
not deputise for him68 . 
The competencies of the panels are laid down by law(§ 14 BVerfGG): The first 
panel is competent for legal review proceedings and constitutional complaints in 
which questions regarding the interpretation of substantive basic rights ( Art.1-17, 
19,101 and 103 I GG) predominate ( so-called "basic right panel"). The second 
panel is primarily responsible for proceedings involving the forfeiture of basic 
rights (Art.18 GG), complaints relating to the scrutiny of elections, impeachment 
of the Federal President and judges, disputes between organs, disputes between 
the Federation and the Lander, and party-prohibition procee_gings (so-called 
"constitutional law panel") and certain other matters assigned to it by a plenary 
decision of the Court69 . 
§ 15 II BVerlGG determines that each panel has a quorum if at least six judges are 
present. 
The South African Constitution requires that a matter before the Court is heard by 
at least eight judges (s.167 (2)). In practice, all eleven judges hear every case. 
According to s.167 (1) of the SA-Constitution the Constitutional Court consists of 
a President, a Deputy President and nine other judges, presently nine men and two 
women70 . 
65 BVerfGE 7, 17 (18) 
66 Umbach/ Clemens,§ 2 s.no.5 
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They are concerned with all issues raised before the Court, there is no distinction 
and specialisation. 
Decisions of the Court are reached by majority vote of the judges sitting in a case. 
Each judge must indicate his or her decision. The reasons for the decision are 
published in a written judgement71 and edited in collections. The same applies for 
the German decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
Hence, in Germany as well as in South Africa the Constitutional Courts' rulings 
are likewis� considered as significant: At least six professional judges in 
l 
Germany and eight in South Africa decide on the matters before the Court and all 
decisions are published. 
From that one can conclude that both Court��Are sufficiently equipped to 
safeguard the respective Constitution. 
D. Competence of the Courts
To evaluate the conception of the Constitutional Court their competence has to be 
considered. Above all the&ourts' competence is expressed by their jurisdiction. 
Though the competence is not only dependent on the cases the Constitutional 
Courts has to rule on, but in particular with Constitutional Courts it is of highly 
�nt.what consequences their decision actually have. Therefore after 
showing the Courts' jurisdiction, the consequences of their ruling will be taken 
into account. 
1. Jurisdiction
At this stage it shall be shown, for what kind of cases the Constitutional Courts 
are responsible for. 
Jurisdiction is defined as "the authority which a court has to decide matters that 
are litigated before it or to take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way 
for its decision" 72. 
The German Constitutional Court's powers range from repealing decisions made 
by authorities or courts in contravention of the Grundgesetz and nullifying 
unconstitutional legislation to passing non-appealable decisions on disputes 
71 
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between the highest governmental organs of the Federation and the Lander73. Due 
to the enumeration principle all possible constellations before the German 
----- --. 
Constitutional Court are laid down by means of law. . -
The different procedures of_the German Constitutional Court can be grouped into 
five main categories: the quasi-political, and th� quasi-penal procedures, the 
control of legislation, the true constitutional controversies and finally the 
complaints of unconstitutionality 74. Additionally the iederal legislature is 
empowered in terms of Art. 93 II GG to 'assign further jurisdiction to the 
Constitutional Court. Nowadays these only play a very secondary role75, hence 
they are not considered in more detail. Though, this provision underlines that the 
assignment of jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court is a constitutional 
respectively a legislative matter and the Court itself has no influence on that. 
In contrast to that the South African Constitutional Court has to interpret on its 
own whether certain issues belong before it. In the following it shall be 
investigated whether the South African Constitutional Court has also jurisdiction 
for all the particular issues in the categories, merely parts of them, or even a 
broader scope of jurisdiction. Where no corresponding jurisdiction to the German 
one is provided for, it will be examined whether such a constellation might comply 
with one of the general terms circumscribing the jurisdiction of the South African 
Constitutional Court. 
Its jurisdiction can be divided into concurrent jurisdiction ( exercised concurrently 
with the High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal) and exclusive 
jurisdiction 76. Whereas the field of the exclusive jurisdiction is set out quite clearly 
in the Constitution, the concurrent jurisdiction is just circumscribed by general 
terms. Hence, the principles relating to the requirements of a referral of an issue to 
the Constitutional Court are mainly set out in two cases 77, S v Zuma78 and S v
Mhlungu79. However, there are also other considerable cases dealing with referrals 
73 Brinkmann, p.83 
74 
Hase/ Ruete, p.268 
75 Pestalozza, p.240 
76 de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p. 81 
77 Devenish, p.225 
78 1995 (4) BCLR 401, 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) 
79 1995 (7) BCLR 793, 1995 3 SA 867 (CC) 
23 
to the Constitutional Court. By considering them it will be examined whether the 
South African Constitutional Court has jurisdiction corresponding to the German 
one.   
a) The Quasi-Political Procedures
Quasi-political procedures encompass these which can be instituted to ban a 
political party or remove the protection of certain fundamental rights from an 
individual. They have as their legal basis the concept of militant or protective 
democracy80 . 
Both procedures play a quantitatively very secondary role in Germany: 
' 
Up to 1995 there were only four applications for the forfeiture of individual rights, 
none of which succeeded; and five to ban a party, of which two actually resulted in 
a prohibition81. 
(1) Forfeiture of Basic Rights
The Federal Constitutional Court's jurisdictio11 for a decision on the forfeiture of 
basic rights is provided for in§§ 13 No. I, 36-41 BVerfGG in conjunction with 
Article 18 GG. 
The protection of the individual basic rights is guaranteed only as long as they are 
not abused to eliminate the free democratic basic order which has made them 
possible in the first place. If someone abuses certain basic rights, in order to 
combat the free democratic basic order, the Bundestag, the Federal Government 
or a Land government can file the case to the Federal Constitutional Court and 
apply for a decision on the forfeiture of the basic rights. 
(2) Prohibition of Parties
According to §§ 13 No.2, 43-46 BVerfGG in conjunction with Art.21 II GG the 
Constitutional Court can ban a party in order to preserve and protect the 
democratic order. Art.21 II GG makes provision for the suppression of the 
activities of parties hostile to the constitution. The free play of political forces in 
the democracy shall be restricted in those cases where opponents of the 
democracy seek to eliminate it by democratic means. Parties which, by reason of 
80 




their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free 
democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany are declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court and 
consequently banned. Moreover, to minimise any abuse of this procedure 82, only
the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the federal government (i.e. the chancellor and 
his cabinet) are authorised to initiate it ( cf § 43 I BVerfGG). It is left to their 
discretion whether they make such an application. They may decide not to do so if 
they consider it better to combat a party they regard as unconstitutional by 
political means, above all by public discussion during an election campaign83. 
South Africa has no particular provision assigning corresponding jurisdiction to 
the Constitutional Court. Anyhow, it has to be examined, whether jurisdiction 
could ensue from the general clause in s.167 (3) (b) of the SA-Constitution. 
S.167 (7) of the SA-Constitution states that a constitutional matter includes any
issue involving the protection of the Constitution. Insofar one could conclude that 
the Constitutional Court might have jurisdiction in such cases. Though, s.1 ( c) of 
the SA-Constitution sets out that South Africa is governed by the rule of law. 
That means that every statetl action needs a legal basis, in other words, there must 
be a law providing for the forfeiture of rights contained in the Bill of Rights as 
well as for the prohibition of political parties. If such provisions existed, their 
application would in any case be an issue involving the interpretation, protection 
or enforcement of the Constitution. A forfeiture of basic rights can only be 
justified as an action in order to protect the Constitution, and the prohibition of a 
party concerns directly the political rights granted by s.19 (1) of the SA­
Constitution. Hence, such matters would belong before the Constitutional Court in 
South Africa as well. 
b) The Quasi-Penal Procedures
The procedures allowing the removal from office of the Federal President and 
Federal judges belong to this category84. 
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Until now there have not been any proceedings for impeachment of the Federal 
President or a judge, neither in Germany nor in South Africa. 
( 1) Impeachment of the Federal President 
An impeachment of the Federal President is set out in §§ 13 No.4, 49-57 
BVerfGG in conjunction with Art.61 GG. 
Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Bundestag or the Bundesrat may 
impeach the Federal President before the Federal Constitutional Court for wilful 
violation of the Grundgesetz or any other federal law. For that it needs a two 
thirds majority of the applying body85 . 
Although the parties before court might be the same, a distinction must be made 
between impeachment of the President and a dispute between organs involving the 
Federal President. The latter relates to the interpretation of the constitution, 
whereas the impeachment deals with the question of whether a culpable act has 
been committed86 . 
Under s.89 (1) of the SA-Constitution the conditions for a removal of the 
President are determined. For that it also needs a two thirds majority in the 
National Assembly, but nothing says that a ruling of a court is additionally 
necessary. Though, if the President wants to defend himself against a removing 
resolution, he can make an application before the Constitutional Court pursuant to 
s.1-67 (4) (e) of the SA-Constitution; the determination whether the President has 
~iled to comply with a constitutional duty lies in the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court87 . 
(2) Impeachment of Federal judges 
§§ 13 No.9, 58-61 BVerfGG in conjunction with Art.98 II GG provide for the 
Constitutional Court's competence to impeach federal judges88, if the Bundestag -
with a majority of the votes cast - had applied for it. Though, according to the 
definition, the judges of the Constitutional Court do not belong to the group of 
federal judges. 
85 Umbach/ Clemens, § 49 s.no. 7 
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Under Art.98 II GG the Bundestag may impeach a judge if he has infringed the 
principles of the Grundgesetz or the constitutional order of a Land. 
The impeachment of judges must be seen in conjunction with the constitutional 
guarantee of the independence of judges (Art.97 GG): The professional and 
personal independence of a judge is not designed to protect him if he contravenes 
the principles of the free democratic order89.
For the removal of judges it is provided by s.177 of the SA-Constitution. The 
provision does not differentiate to what court the judges belong. There is no 
requirement for any court's ruling in case of the removal of judges. In the end it is 
the President, who actually removes the particular judge. Hence, it is questionable 
whether the judge, if he wants to defend himself against his removal, can apply for 
a proceeding based on s.167 (4) (a) of the SA-Constitution. Therefore the federal 
judges must be able to considered as organs of the state. The Constitutional Court 
i�e the other courts as well have constitutional status, powers and 
functions, but not the judges themselves. Thus, they cannot be seen as organs of 
state. 
For them the provision of s.167 (6) (a) of the SA-Constitution might apply, if the 
judge's defence is a. genuine constitutional matter. That could be assumed if the 
constitution specified the condition upon which a removing resolution could be 
adopted and a removal thus were a matter of constitutional interpretation. 
Though, a judge who offends his removal, will rather bring forward that the 
circumstances which lead to his removal were wrongly evaluated. Hence, it might 
only be a constitutional matter, if the judge bemoans the conduct of procedure, 
which is actually set out in s.177 of the SA-Constitution. Such a case is, anyhow, 
nearly unimaginable. Therefore one can conclude that in principle the 
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction does not encompass decisions on the removal 
of judges. 
c) The Control of Legislation
Under this category fall the claims to declare a law void as repugnant to the 
constitution. It is also called judicial review90 . 
89 Wohnnann, p.12 
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These procedures can be instituted in Germany by the judiciary in pending cases or 
by the Federal government, governments of the Lander, or one third of the 
members of the Bundestag91. The Constitutional Court then has to decide whether 
any form of either original, i.e. parliamentary, or of delegated legislation is in 
accordance with the Grundgesetz92• 
Federal and Land legislation is subject to the constitutional order (Art.20 III GG). 
. A law which is adopted by the correct procedures is not automatically compatible 
with the constitution. Its substance must also be in conformity with the 
constitution; in particular; it must not violate the basic rights of the individual. 
Art. I III GG expressly states that the basic rights listed in it are binding upon the 
legislature. The Federal Constitutional Court must check that the legislature acts 
in accordance with the provisions of the Grundgesetz when issuing legal rules. The 
Grundgesetz envisages various types of procedure for this purpose. 
Also in South Africa legislation must accord to the Constitution. As s.2 of the SA-
Constitution states expressly, the supremacy of the Constitution implies that law 
and conduct inconsistent with it is invalid. The South African Constitutional Court 
is also in charge to review laws under this aspect. The eleven judges of the South 
African Constitutional Court emphasised that the Court 'hlust not shrink from this 
task"93 of review, otherwise South Africa would be back to parliamentary 
sovereignty and, by implication, back to unrestrained violation of rights so 
common under previous Parliaments94 . 
(1) Review of Law in General 
Review of law in general, or abstract review, means the referral of a Bill to the 
Constitutional Court, before i\\enacted into law95 . ts; 
91 Hase/ Ruete, p.268 
92 Hase/ Ruete, p.268 
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Review of law in general is called in Germany abstrakte Normenkontrolle. It is 
provided for in§§ 13 No.6, 76-79 in conjunction with Art.93 I 2 GG. Up to the 
end of 1995 an amount of 126 cases of this kind had been pending before the 
Federal Constitutional Court and 71 decisions passed96. 
In proceedings of this type, the Federal Constitutional Court decides 
independently on a specific dispute on the compatibility of federal law or Land law 
with the Grundgesetz or on the compatibility of Land law with other federal law. 
Only the Federal Government, a Land government or at least one third of the 
members of the Bundestag may apply for such proceedings. By this it means in 
particular the opposition in the Bundestag, provided that it holds at least one third 
of the seats, has recourse to the Federal Constitutional Court if it considers a law 
adopted by the majority of the deputies to be unconstitutionai97. 
The subject of such review may be any legal rule of the Federation or of a Land; in 
other words, not merely laws adopted by parliament but also government 
ordinances or the by-laws of independent public bodies. It is immaterial whether 
the rule was issued before or after the entry into force of the Grundgesetz98 . 
A variation of the abstrakte Normenkontrolle is contained in Art.93 I No.2a GG, 
according to which the Federal Constitutional Court shall rule also in case of 
disagreement as to whether a law meets the requirements of Art. 72 II GG which 
gives the Federation the right to legislate concurrently with the Lander. Applicants  
for that procedures may be the Bundesrat, a Land government or a Land 
parliament. 
(b) The South African Model
Firstly to mention in this context is the Court's responsibility to certify the text of 
the final constitution of 1996. This task was assigned to the Court in terms of s. 71 
(2) of the interim constitution. Accordingly the Court was empowered to let the









As in Germany the South African Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction 
for review of law in general99 . The responsibility of the Court for these issues is 
established by s.167 (4) (b) and (c) of the SA-Constitution. No.13 and 14 CCR set 
out some formal prerequisites for lodging such a case before the Court. 
Corresponding to the German regulation, the Court has to decide on national as 
well as provincial legislation. 
Sub-Subs. b refers to s. 79 respectively s.121 of the SA-Constitution, whereas 
s.167 (4) (c) of the SA-Constitution highlights s.80 respectively 122 of the SA­
Constitution. (fh;�)lrovisions determine the possible applicants for reviewing
certain bills,.,. /Jc tJ5 Cf.A.ill\._ �; 1 L 5
/ .  
Pursuant to the first mentioned ones, the President for national Bills and the 
Premier of a Province are entitled to refer a Bill to the Court for a decision on its 
constitutionality before assenting to that Bill 10°, if they have reservations about the 
constitutionality of the Bill. 
The latter ones lay down, that at least one third of the National Assembly and at� 
c�;rts� �( 4 ), 148-150 of the SA-Constitution indicate.· O\o t
least 20 percent of a provincial legislature can apply to the Constitutional Court 
for legal review as well. 
In contrast to the German provision, decisions on conflicts between national and 
provincial legislati�n -���_not _E:ss_i .$_��-� to the _Co_n _stitutional _ 
 
C.�mrt, but to other 
 
Moreover, s.167 ( 4) ( d) provides for the Court's responsibility on the 1
· 
constitutionality of any amendment to the constitution. The legislative process for  
Bills amending the Constitution is determined by s. 74 of the SA-Constitution. 
S. 74 (9) of the SA-Constitution states that, like all other national bills, must be
referred to the President. Hence, he can initiate a decision of the Constitutional
Court pursuant to s. 79 ( 4) (b) in conjunction with s. 84 (2) ( c) ( 4 ) (b) of the SA­
Constitution.
Parliamentary applic_ations in that regard are in effect restricted: According to s. 74
(1) of the SA-Constitution amendments of s. I and 7 4 (1) of the SA-Constitution
itself need a supporting quorum of at least 75 percent of the National Assembly's
members. It is highly unlikely that members, who voted in favour of the
99 de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p.81 
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amendment would also support an application to the Constitutional Court. Yet the 
remaining part of the Parliament consists of 4 highest 25 percent of the members, 
which is not enough to apply for a Constitutir nal Court's ruling, although it might 
be of particular importance in such cases. 
The Bill of Rights and the other Chapters of the South African Constitution can be 
amended by a supporting vote of at least two thirds of the National Assembly's 
members. Only if the minimum quorum was achieved and the remaining share of 
the members agree on an application to the Constitutional Court, a review­
procedure of the constitution-amendment can be filed in accordance with s.80 (2) 
of the SA-Constitution. As any amendment of the Constitution and especially 
amendments of the Bill of Rights are always very crucial matters, it appears not 
without reason, to let the Constitutional Court rule on the constitutionality of it by 
a parliamentary motion. 
(
It is, in additioq,..)n contrast to s.144 of the SA-Constitution (in conjunction with 
s.16 CCR, providing for certain formal parameters). There it is laid down th�
7 least provincial legislature which has passed or amended a provincial constitution, 
must submit the text to the Constitutional (i:ourt for certification. One could argue 
that the national (constitution effects even more people than , a provincial 
constitution and should therefore be checked and approved by the legal experts of 
the Constitutional Court, like it was provided in s.71 (2) of the interim 
Constitution, but other, perhaps less efficient review mechanisms still exist101 .
Constitution. However, certification is not required for each amendment to the\. 
Shcr/t COV'l,' 111 S 
Nonetheless, if one considers it as a gap of constitutional check and balance, that Y
�arliament cannot apply to the Constitutional Court in regard to constitutional 
amendments, this gap also exists in Germany, where constitutional amendments 
need a minimum quorum of two thirds of the Bundestag's members as well (c.f 
Art. 79 II GG). Although, amendments affecting the division of the Federation into 
Lander, their participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in 
Art. I and 20 GG are prohibited by means of Art. 79 III GG anyway. 
Another considerable difference to the German regulation in that regard is the fact 




by the President �_QX the Premier of a Province can only be filed when
they are in charge to assent and sign the Bill at hand, and the legislative right to
apply is restricted to 30 days after the date the President respectively the Premier
assented to and signed the Act. Therefore it is excluded to refer to an established
act for legal review by the South African Constitutional Court. Hence, legal
review in general concerning acts issued before the entering into force of the
�nstitution, is not possible in South Africa.
(2) Review of specific laws (konkrete
Normenkontrolle) 
For this kind of procedure §§ 13 No. I 1, 80-82 BVerfGG in conjunction with
Art. I 00 I GG lays down the conditions.
Such procedures arise out of an ordinary law suit102. Cases of this type occur
when a court considers a law to be unconstitutional the validity of which is
relevant to its decision in a specific case. Every court in Germany is entitled and
duty-bound to examine whether legal provisions are compatible with the
�enstitution. The courts must stay their proceedings and obtain a decision from
the Federal Constitutional Court if it considers a statutory provision to be
incompatible with the constitution or a Land law incompatible with a Federal law
(Art.100 I GG).
It is intended that only the Federal Constitutional Court as a constitutional organ
should be able to declare that a law enacted by the democratic legislature is
unconstitutional and hence null and void. This procedure serves to ensure
confidence in law and uniform administration of justice; this might not be possible
if each individual court were authorised to ignore a statutory provision which it
deems unconstitutional 103.
The court must transmit to the Federal Constitutional Court the files of the case
and state in detail why its decision in that case depends on the validity of the
statutory provision submitted for review and why it considers that provision to be






the legal rule submitted is compatible with the constitution; it does not decide on 
the legal dispute itself which was the cause of the submission. 
Since this method of reviewing specific laws is to take account of the authority of 
the democratic legislature, it applies only to laws which have been enacted by 
legislative bodies bound by the Grundgesetz. Laws which were passed before the 
Grundgesetz came into force in May 1949 (so-called pre-constitutional law) as 
well as legal provisions not enacted by the parliament (such as government 
ordinances) may be reviewed by individual courts themselves, who may choose 
not to apply them in the dispute before them. 
Proceedings involving the review of specific laws account for the second largest 
share of the Federal Constitutional Court's activities. Up to the end of 1995 2,955 
w� 
cases had been pending before the court and 973 decisions passed. The court has 
__. 
found over 300 statutory provisions to be null and void or incompatible with the 
Grundgesetz (or a Federal law). It has taken numerous important decisions in 
various fields, e.g. access to higher education104, nuclear energy105, marital and 
family affairs106, on social affairs107, taxation 1°8, and on the constitutionality of life
imprisonment 109.
The review of specific laws provided for in South Africa is fundamentally different 
from the German regulation. The enquiry into the constitutionality of law does not 
lie in the Constitutional Court's exclusive jurisdiction like in Germany, but is a 
matter of concurrent jurisdiction. 
A dispute over the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament, provincial legislation 
or delegated legislation and conduct of the President can be heard, according to 
s.172 (2) (a) of the SA-Constitution, by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High
Court or a court of similar status110 . They are entitled to declare an order of 
constitutional invalidity. Yet, this declaration has no force unless it is confirmed by 
1
04 BVerfGE 33, p.303 
105 BVerfGE 49, p.89 
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the Constitutional Court. Meanwhile, s. 8 ( 1) of the CCCA requires that an order 
of constitutional invalidity shall be referred to the Constitutional Court for 
confirmation. Thus, the application for confirmation has become superfluous, as 
the referral of an order of invalidity will automatically be done by the Court 
concerned 111 . 
(3) Confirmation of public international law 
Pursuant to§§ 13 No.12, 83, 84 BVerfGG in conjunction with Art.100 II GG the 
Federal Constitutional Court decides, when requested by a court, whether a rule 
of public international law is an integral part of Federal law and whether such rule 
directly creates rights and duties for the individual. This is designed to limit any 
impairment of the authority of the legislature and of confidence in law that might 
result from the incorporation of general rules of public international law into 
Federal law since such rules take precedence over national laws (Article 25 GG) 
(on this procedure cf Articles 83 and 84 BVerfGG). Up to the end of 1995 twelve 
such cases had been pending before the Federal Constitutional Court and 6 
d · · dll2 ec1s1ons passe . 
As s.231 (4) ofthe SA-Constitution sets out, international agreements in principle 
become law in South Africa when it is enacted by national legislation. 
Consequently the rules for the national legislative process laid down in s. 73 et.seq. 
of the SA-Constitution apply. Thus, international law can be referred to the 
Constitutional Court pursuant to s.79 (4) (b) in conjunction with s.84 (2) (c) and 
80 of the SA-Constitution. 
( 4) Submission by Constitutional Courts of a 
Land 
According to §§ 13 No.13, 85 BVerfGG in conjunction with Art.100 III GG, the 
constitutional court of a Land which, in interpreting the Grundgesetz, proposes to 
deviate from a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court or of the constitutional 
m de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p.94 
112 Wohrmann, p.19 
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court of another Land must obtain a decision from the Federal Constitutional 
Court113 . 
As South Africa's provinces indeed have their own constitutions but no 
Constitutional Courts, parallel cases cannot occur. 
d) The True Constitutional Controversies 
True constitutional controversies are those between different state agencies on 
their rights and duties114. This includes such disputes between highest federal 
organs as well as differences between the Federation and a Bundesland115 . 
To the South African Constitutional Court may also be assigned corresponding 
jurisdiction by s.167 ( 4) (a) of the SA-Constitution. 
After showing the German procedures, it will be investigated whether the 
particular procedure would also be possible before the South African Court. 
( 1) Disputes between organs 
( Organstreitverf ahren) 
These are disputes between governmental organs in which one organ claims that 
its constitutional rights under the Grundgesetz have been harmed or directly 
endangered by the conduct of another organ. These disputes are not very 
frequently brought before the Constitutional Court: Up to the end of 1995 112 
cases involving disputes between organs had been pending before the Federal 
Constitutional Court and 53 decisions passed 116 . 
For these type of procedures it is provided for in §§ 13 No.5,63-67 BVerfGG in 
conjunction with Art. 93 I 1 GG. The organs, which can be involved, are the 
Federal President, the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the Federal Government and 
components of those organs, e.g. a gro3/fu the Bundestag or, under certain 
circumstances, individual deputies117. L/ 
113 Wohrmann, p.20 
114 Hase/ Ruete, p.268 
115 Karpen, p.79 
116 Wohrmann, p.12 
117 v.Munch - Meyer, Art.93 s.no.26, 27 
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Corresponding cases in South Africa would be those, which occur between organs 
-1- �t'W n•H 1 "' I
of state in the national sphere of government. These cases are in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 118.
It has to be asked, which organs can actually be involved as well as who can lodge 
the procedure. 
As s.167 (4) (a) of the SA-Constitution encompasses only disputes 'concerning 
the constitutional status, powers or functions': only those organs which are 
actually furnished with that can be involved. These o_rgans of state are the National 
Assembly and the NCOP as well as the Cabinet and the President, although an 
application to the Constitutional Court in that regard is not expressly mentioned in 
the fairly comprehensive list of the President's powers and functions of s.84 (2) of 
the SA-Constitution. 
Noteworthy is also s.167 ( 4) ( e) of the SA-Constitution in this context. It sets out 
that not only actions but also omissions (i.e. failures to fulfil an obligation) of the 
Parliament or the President can be subject of a case before the Constitutional 
Court. 
Though, it remains open, who can actually initiate such procedures before court. 
However, s.167 ( 4) (a) of the SA-Constitution speaks of 'tlisputes between" the 
particular organs. That can only be interpreted, that it must be a controversy 
involving exclusively the above-mentioned organs. Consequently only these can 
apply for a ruling by the Constitutional Court. 
Normally an application by one of the two· 1egislative bodies needs the support of 
its majority. Notwithstanding, if a party or an individual member of one of the 
bodies claims an infringement of its (respectively his) constitutional rights, they 
may also file the case before the Constitutional Court. These cases could occur for 
instance, if a party is not allowed to send delegates to the NCOP in violation of 
s.61 (1) of the SA-Constitution or the Speaker respectively the Deputy Speaker is
removed from office against s.52 ( 4) of the SA-Constitution. 
The wording of s.167 ( 4) ( e) of the SA-Constitution, however, does not give any 
hints to the possible applicants for a dispute between organs. Hence, one has to 
ask, which organs or individuals could actually be involved in such a dispute. 
118 de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p.81 / 
. ) 
A dispute can arise from overstepping powers and disobeying obligations. The 
Parliament's general obligations are prescribed in s.55 (2) of the SA-Constitution. 
Though, to maintain oversight of the exercise of national executive authority as 
well as any organ of the state, does not limit the group of possible applicants 
either: every single citizen and all state organs, too, could claim to be concerned if 
the Parliament lost oversight. Therefore the group of possible applicants cannot be 
describ�an those who can claim an �g{'t11ent of rights 
caused by the failure to fulfil the Parliament's obligations. 
The President's obligations are laid down in s.84 of the SA-Constitution. If he · 
. .
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Disputes between the Federation and 
Si 
the
In a federal state disputes over rights and duties may occur not only -1 between <-\ 
--federal organs but also between the Federation and the Lander as well as between 
individual Lander. In particular, these disputes relate to the delimitation of 
competencies between the Federation and the Lander as established in the 
Grundgesetz. 
Pursuant to§§ 13 No.7,and 8, 68-72 BVerfUG in conjunction with Art.93 I No.3 
and 4 GG the Federal Constitutional Court decides on such disputes. Only the 
Federal Government and Land governments may be parties .to them and are 
,\Uthorised to bring such suits119 . 
Up to the end of 1995 101 such cases had been pending before the Federal 
Constitutional Court and 48 decisions passed120. 
For such proceedings s. 167 (4) (a) of the SA-Constitution assigns exclusive 
jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court. It shall decide disputes not only between 
organs of state in the national but also the provincial sphere. 
119 Kommers, p.14 
120 Wohrmann, p.14
(3) Disputes within a Land
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According to §§ 13 No.8 third alternative, 13 No.10, 71-75 BVerfGG in 
conjunction with Art.93 IV third alternative, and Article 99 GG the Federal 
Constitutional Court decides on disputes between organs within a Land unless 
recourse to another court exists (Art.93 IV, 3. alternative GG). This ensures that, 
if there are any gaps in the legal protection afforded by the constitutional court of 
a Land, a dispute between constitutional organs of the Land can still be brought 
before a constitutional court. 
Furthermore the Federal Constitutional Court decides on constitutional disputes 
within a Land if such decision has been assigned to it by Land legislation (Art.99 
GG). Schleswig-Holstein has made use of this possibility. The Federal 
Constitutional Court has thus decided on several disputes in that Land. 
Up to the end of 1995 16 cases involving such disputes had been pending before 
the Federal Constitutional Court and 10 decisions passed121 . 
As the South African provinces do not have their own constitutional courts, 
disputes between organs of state only in the provincial sphere fall under the 
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction by means of s.167 (4) (a) of the SA-
Constitution as well. 
e) The Complaints of Unconstitutionality 
Complaints of unconstitutionality are to be understood as complaints made in the 
case of national elections and also individual complaints of unconstitutional state's 
action122 . The latter is ~d by individual citizens123 and are by far the most 
frequent procedure: 
Well over 95 percent of the Federal Constitutional Court's caseload consists of 
constitutional complaints124. It has been employed over 100,000 times from 1951 ~ 
to 1995, whereas only a total of 89 cases involving the scrutiny of elections or the 
loss of seats had been pending before the Federal Constitutional Court 125. 
m Wohrmann, p.15 
122 Hase/ Ruete, p.269 
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The South African situation in that regard is almost the opposite: There is no 
assignment of jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court for scrutiny of elections and 
no such case was brought before the South African Constitutional Court until 
now. Anyhow, it will be taken into consideration, in which cases the South 
African court might be concerned with cases like that. 
( 1) Scrutiny of elections 
§§ 13 No.3, 48 BVerfGG in conjunction with Art.41 II GG lay down the Federal 
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction for decisions on the validity of elections. 
Elections to the Bundestag are first scrutinised by the Bundestag itself (Art.41 I 
GG), which has a special preparatory committee for this purpose. The Bundestag 
also decides whether a deputy has lost his seat in the Bundestag; the conditions 
under which such a loss occurs are laid down in the Federal Electoral Law. The 
persons affected may lodge a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court 
against a decision of the Bundestag on the validity of an election or the loss of a 
seat. 
The purpose of the election scrutiny procedure is to ensure the right composition 
of the Bundestag. A complaint can therefore be successful only in the case of an 
error which has actually had repercussions on the distribution of seats. 
In general the scrutiny of elections is not a matter to be dealt with by the South 
African Constitutional Court. As the conduct of elections is not set out in the 
constitution, it is not a constitutional matter and therefore not within the 
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction. 
However, one might think about the possibility to initiate a proceeding pursuant to 
s.167 ( 4) (a) of the SA-Constitution: Organs of states like the National Assembly 
or the Speaker respectively Deputy Speaker could lodge an according application 
to the Constitutional Court against the Electoral Commission, if this commission 
can be seen as an organ of state. All the same, s.190 (1) of the SA-Constitution 
assigns powers and functions to it. Consequently, if the Electoral Commission 
shall be attacked by another organ of state, the Constitutional Court might be 
responsible for a decision on that. 
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(2) Constitutional Co�p�n�s /
(Verfassungsbeschwerden) I Direct access 
Constitutional complaints are provided for by §§ 13 No.Sa, 90-96 BVerfGG in 
conjunction with Art. 93 I No.4a and b GG. Su�h procedure may be lodged by any 
 person who claims that one of his basic rights has been violated by an act or 
omission of public authority. Any person can petition the Constitutional Court 
directly and personally to declare a statute unconstitutional and void, to set aside 
an executive act or to reverse the decision of any other court 126. However, the 
requirement for lodging such a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court is � 't/ 
that there is no other means of eliminating the violation of a basic right. In 
principle all remedies within the relevant branch of jurisdiction ( e.g. civil, criminal, 
administrative) must therefore first be exhausted before having recourse to the � 
Federal Constitutional Court (Principle of subsidiarity, cf § 90 II BVerfGG). The 
Court highlighted on several occasions that it does not serve as a 
"Superrevisionsinstanz", in other words, it is not the superior instance of 
appellations. The Federal Constitutional Court is not a court of appeal which 
decides on questions of constitutional law arising in the course of civil or penal 
proceedings, for example. Its exclusive responsibility is to decide on questions of 
constitutional law; its task is to interpret the Grundgesetz with final binding 
force 127. 
I GI
The South African Court does not hear evidence nor question witnesses. It does 
not decide directly whether accused persons are guilty or w.hether damages should 
be awarded to an injured person. These are matters for the ordinary courts. Its 
function is to determine the meaning of the Constitution in relation to matters in 
dispute 128.
South Africa's Constitutional Court has not got a corresponding jurisdiction. As 
other courts have constitutional jurisdiction as well, an individual person normally 
lodges ordinary procedures before these courts. The Constitution makes it 
possible for a wide range of individuals and public and private bodies to raise 
126 Rupp-v. Briinneck, p.390 
127 Wohrmann, p.5 
128 Constitutional Court's Homepage 
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constitutional questions in litigation before the High Court. Therefore, anyone 
wishing to bring a constitutional case before the Constitutional Court must usually 
start in the High Court129. 
The only way, an individual person can bring a case before the Constitutional 
Court is by an application for direct access. 
Direct access means that a matter is heard by the Constitutional Court at first 
instance 130 . 
It will probably be possible in two instances: where the matter is one within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court and in matters over which concurrent 
jurisdiction is exercised, where the matter is in the interest ofjustice131 . 
In terms of s.100 (2) of the interim Constitution, the constitutional court should 
ovision for direct access to the court where it was in the interest of justice 
do so, in respect to any matter within its jurisdiction. No.17 CCR 1995 had 
provided for formal prerequisites and that applications for direct access are 
permissible in exceptional cases only132. 
Yet, the final constitution states that any person or organ of the state with a 
sufficient interest might have direct access to the Constitutional Court ( cf. s. 1 72 
(2)(d) of the SA-Constitution). It also demands provision for direct access to the 
Court for matters in the interest of justice. Furthermore s.167 (6) of the SA-
Constitution sets out another prerequisite for direct access: the application must 
be "with leave" of the Constitutional Court~ Neither No.17 CCR 1998 nor any 
other provision specifies the terms "interest of justice" and "with leave of the 
Court". 
As the interpretation of these terms directly determines which cases are to be 
heard by the court, it appears to be worthwhile to take a closer look at the Court's 
findings. 
The judges of the Constitutional Court will decide if an important question of 
principle relating to the interpretation of the Constitution has been raised in the 
application for leave to appeal, and will consider, whether there is a reasonable 
129 Constitutional Court's Homepage 
130 de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p.91 
131 de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p.91 
132 Burns, p.38 
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prospect that the appeal may succeed 133. Whilst the prospects of success are 
clearly relevant to applications for direct access to the Court, there are other 
considerations which are at least of equal importance. These factors have been 
referred to in decisions given by the Court on applications for direct access under 
the inteFifh Constitution, and are clearly relevant to the granting of direct access 
[pnae:the 1996 Constitution134. However, the interpretation of the term "interest 
of justice" might have been influenced by the second condition, that direct access 
should only be granted in exceptional cases. By now there is no such provision any 
more, but instead the prerequisite of leave from the Constitutional Court. If the 
interpretation of interest of justice in conjunction with granting direct access in 
exceptional cases is still only valid for the regulation of the final Constitution, thus 
depends on the meaning of the prerequisite "leave of the Court". 
(a) Leave of the Court 
This prerequisite indicates that the Court itself has the power to grant permission 
or to reject hearing a case. All the same, it could be contented that "leave of the 
Court" indicates there might be circumstances beyond the interests of justice to 
grand direct access 135 . In other words, either direct access is granted because it is 
in the interests of justice, or because it is with leave of the Court. 
The Court itself, nonetheless, considered "Leave to appeal" as a requirement 
'needed to "protect" the process of the Court against abuse by appeals which have 
no merit 136 . S.167 (6) makes clear that the Constitutional Court is to have both 
original and appellate jurisdiction, and the power to control access to it by 
granting leave only in cases where it is in the interest of justice 137. 
Consequently, "leave of the Court" does not open another gate for direct access to 
the Court, but is dependent upon the interest of justice; the latter is a condition ~ 
,...--1 
\0\\v1 sine qua non for granting leave. Hence, considering th.:C~r6tectoral aspect of 
granting leave, one can assume, that "interests of justice"will be interpreted quite 
133 Constitutio~l Court's Hon1epage-'-
134 Bruce and Another v·Fleec5tex Joham1esburg CC and Others 1998 (4) BCLR 415 (CC), 
para.7 
135 Bruce and Another v Fleecytex Johannesburg CC and Others 1998 (4) BCLR 415 (CC), 
para.4 E 
136 S v Pennigton and Another 1997 (10) BCLR 1413 (CC), para.26 I, A 
137 S v Pennigton and Another 1997 (10) BCLR 1413 (CC), para.11 
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narrowly. That corresponds with the narrow interpretation by the Court because 
of the then valid provision of,No.17 CCR 1995, that only in exceptional cases 
direct access should be permitted. 
Thus, direct access to the Constitutional Court appears still to be mainly 
depending upon the interpretation of "interests of justice". Consequently, "Leave 
of the Court" has in fact a similar meaning like "direct access in exceptional cases 
only" and therefore influences the interpretation of"interests of justice" at least in 
a similar manner. 
Hence, one can assume, that the interpretation of "interests of justice" remains 
without change under the final Constitution. 
(b) Interest of Justice 
Numerous judgements have dealt with the interpretation of this general legal term, 
which statements produced some general principles to be shown in the following: 
It will only be in the interest of justice for a constitutional issue to be decided 
/fi(si'i~ihere there are compelling reasons that this should be done. It will only be 
'--.__/,,.. 
necessary for this to be done where the appeal cannot be disposed of without the 
constitutional issue being decided138. 
In matters over which concurrent jurisdiction is exercised, the matter must be of 
sufficient public importance or urgency to necessitate direct access 139. If another 
remedy or procedure is available, it cannot be said that urgency or the interests of 
justice necessitate circumventing the ordinary procedures and requiring the 
Constitutional Court to adjudicate the matter at first instance. Only in very unusual 
Ga✓.xceptional cases will the issues raised to be of sufficient urgency and public 
importance to justify direct access to the Constitutional Court140. 
There might be cases where the circumstances are so exceptional and the public 
interest, or the ends of justice or good government, are of such overriding 
importance, that the Court might be disposed to grant direct access under No.17 
CCR 1995141 . This rule had permitted direct access only in exceptional 
138 Zantsi v Council of State and Others 1995 (10) BCLR 1424 (CC) para.4 A 
139 de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p.91 
140 de Waal/ Currie/ Erasmus, p.93 
141 Hekpoort Environmental Preservation Society and Another v Minister of Land Affairs and 
Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1537 (CC), para.IO H 
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circumstances, which in fact means, that in addition to the importance of the 
matter, there be proof 'that the delay necessitated by the use of the ordinary 
procedures would prejudice the public interest or prejudice the ends of justice and 
good government" 142. In several cases the Court has confirmed that it has a 
discretion to allow direct access and that it will not allow direct access to it in the 
b f . l . 143 a sence o except1ona circumstances . 
Implicit within the requirement that the matter be in the interest of justice is a 
consideration of whether there are reasonable prospects of success upon 
referral144. The reasonable prospect of success is to be understood as a sine qua 
non of a referral, not as in itself a sufficient ground. It is not always in the interest 
of justice to make a reference as soon as the relevant issue has been raised 145 . 
The 'interest of justice" even requires such a consideration, for if appeals without 
merit were allowed, justice would be delayed 146 . 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that time, costs and public importance are 
imp,.S-,rtant considerations147. However, these are not the only factors that have to 
l,),-{taken into account in deciding what is in the interest of justice in any given 
case 148 . In considering the question whether it is in the interest of justice that the 
Constitutional Court should exercise its jurisdiction directly, it is also relevant to 
have regard to the nature of the issue concerned 149. If the constitutional matter 
involves the development of the common law, it is a jurisdiction which ought not 
142 Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of land Affairs and Another 1996 (12) BCLR 1573 
(CC) para.18 
143 Tsotetsi v Mutual and Federal Insurance Company Ltd.1996 (11) BCLR 1439 (CC) para.11 
E (with numerous references) 
144 Tsotetsi v Mutual and Federal Insurance Company Ltd.1996 (11) BCLR 1439 (CC) para.4 J, 
A; 
S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC) para.59 
145 S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC) para.59 
146 S v Pennigton and Another 1997 (10) BCLR 1413 (CC), para.261, A 
147 De Freitas and Another v Society of Advocates of Natal 1998 (11) BCLR 1345 (CC), para.20 
148 Member of the Executive Council for Development Planning and Local Government in the 
Provincial Government of Gauteng v Democratic Party and Others, 1998 (7) BCLR 855 
(CC), para.31 
149 De Freitas and Anotherv Society of Advocates ofNatal 1998 (11) BCLR 1345 (CC), para.21 
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ordinarily to be exercised without the matter having first dealt with by the 
Supreme Court of AppeaIJ50 . 
✓ 
These statements lead to the conclusion, that direct access to the Constitutional 
Court, applied for by anybody, is rather the exception than the rule. In contrast to 
the German Court the South African one is not open for constitutional complaints 
by anybody in general. 
2. The Jurisdictional Differences 
In summary one can say, that the Courts' scope of jurisdiction in general is quite 
similar. The constellations which in Germany are set out by means of law as 
matters of constitutional jurisdiction, might presumably be heard by the South 
African Constitutional Court as well. However, some peculiar differences appear 
to be interesting. 
For constellations of the quasi-political procedures, if they indeed could occur in 
South Africa, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court might correspond to the 
German one, but the jurisdiction concerning quasi-penal procedures differ: 
Whereas in Germany it is obligatorily the Federal Constitutional Court's turn to 
decide over the removal of the President, the South African President can be 
removed without a ruling by a court. In that regard a high responsibility is 
assigned to the German Court, which lacks the South African. The same applies 
insofar for the removal of judges. Though, even if such a move is brought before a 
court, it would not be preferable the South African Constitutional Court to deal 
with that matter. 
Some noteworthy differences exist in the control of legislation. The review of law 
in general, what is called in Germany abstrakte Normenkontrolle, is regulated to a 
great extent similarly. An unknown phenomenon for the Constitutional Court in 
Germany, nonetheless, is the obligation of the South African Constitutional Court 
to certify provincial constitutions and in terms of the interim Constitution the 
certification of the present final Constitution. The South African Court is thus not 
only a guardian of the Constitution, but also involved in the creating process and 
therefore in a way a creator of the Constitution. 
150 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1998 (10) BCLR 1207 (CC) para.33 
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The jurisdiction for review of specific law, i.e. the konkrete Normenkontrolle, is
differently because of the exclusive constitutional jurisdiction of the German
Court. The Federal Constitutional Court's power results from the fact, that it is
the one and only court which can decide on constitutional matters with binding
force. The South African Constitutional Court, in contrast, only has an appellate
function. The jurisdictional power in that context is confined to a confirmation
respectively non-confirmation of the decision ou_�..!]Yiqu�.instance.
Another noteworthy power, which{!fc� �outh African Co�lis the Federal 
Constitutional Court's to direct Constitutional Courts of the Lander. Their
dependence on the Federal Constitutional Court's permission, if they want to 
deviate from a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, shows the superior 
a position of the German Constitutional Court.
The true constitutional controversies are not handled very differently, but the
complaints of unconstitutionality are very unusual for the South African
Constitutional Court. Indeed, also in South Africa such constellations might be
brought before the Constitutional Court, but the quantitative extent of the German
cases differs radically from the South Africa situation, where such cases are heard
only in exceptional cases by the Constitutional Court.
3. The Consequences of the Courts' Ruling
Here the impacts of the Courts' decisions shall be shown.
It is a salutary rule, not only for the South African Constitutional Court, that a
court should generally decide no more than what is absolutely necessary for the
adjudication of a case. It is also undesirable that the courts should anticipate
constitutional questions or decide them in advance of the necessity of such a
decision151 . The Courts are therefore obliged to exercise judicial self-restraint 152. 
On the other hand, in deciding on the relative powers of state organs, a
Constitutional Court faces the threat that any of thes�ould ignore or
publicly disregard its decision153 . 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Courts' findings about a decisive constitutional
matter of a particular case do not only concern the parties involved directly but at
151 
Devenish, p.225 
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least reflect upon all subjects who are dependent on the law involved. Yet, the 
results for the parties participating in a case will less be taken into consideration, 
but rather the implications on the legal and political system in general. 
The Verf assungsbeschwerden usually have a relatively small effect on the legal and 
political system. Mostly they bring relief to the complainant, if successful, of an 
unconstitutional administrative conduct or an unconstitutional interpretation of 
law of a court during a pending case. Though, the decision on the particular case 
implies the order to the administration respectively the courts to act in future times 
in compliance with it. Nonetheless, as the scrutiny of constitutionality is 
comprehensive during such proceedings, it sometimes turns out, that the legal 
basis for the attacked action is unconstitutional. Then the decision gets a 
legislative and thus a political implication. 
The impeachment proceedings, in contrast, have rather political than legal 
implications, and, in a way, the decisions on the forfeiture of rights as well. 
Regarding the latter ones, the Federal Constitutional Court decides which basic 
rights the person concerned has forfeited and for what length of time. Besides that 
the Court can, for the duration of the forfeiture, deny the right to vote and to be 
elected as well as the capacity to hold public office. Such a decision does mainly 
concern the particular individual involved. Though, since a person who has 
forfeited his rights, must have in some way agitated against the state in front of a 
certain audience, a proclamation of unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court 
effects at least the people who paid attention. Therefore the forfeiture of basic 
rights is definitely a political affair. 
Also the Federal Constitutional Court's declaration of the forfeiture of the Federal 
President's or a judge's office is more than just the confirmation of a dismissal. 
The impeachment of the federal President or judge are of peculiar political interest 
only because of the fact that the political organs have to elect a successor. 
Usually a decision, whether an organ has stayed within the limits of the functions 
assigned to it or has exceeded its competencies, has also a far-reaching impact on 
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constitutional law and political affairs154. In its decision the court states whether 
the act or omission complained of infringes a provision of the Grundgesetz. In 
future the organ has to comply with the principles which result from the Court's 
decision. As only state-leading organs can participate in such cases, the court thus 
interferes in their politics and eventually with the manner of state-leadership. 
However, the cases of law review have probably the severest impact on politics. 
The question whether or not a statute is in accordance with the constitution may 
theoretically arise in nearly all constitutional proceedings before the Federal 
Constitutional Court. Practically it arises only in the cases of constitutional 
complaints (Verfassungsbeschwerden), and the procedural avenues of abstrakten 
and konkreten Normenkontrollen155 . 
Indeed, the application for proceedings of an abstrakte Normenkontrolle need not 
serve the purpose of having a legal rule declared null and void; rather, the court 
may also be asked to state expressly that a provision is compatible with the 
Grundgesetz, for instance if doubts exist in practice about the compatibility of 
Federal or Land law with the Grundgesetz or of Land law with Federal law156. 
Though, in any event, the question of the law's validity is squarely before the 
court in these proceedings, and a decision against its validity renders the law null 
and void157. 
Notwithstanding, judicial law-making in the form of judicial review is 
fund~ntally different from making law by legislation158; the Court's role is far 
vfore limited than that of Parliament. The court can decide only after it has been 
asked159. However, through its jurisdiction a Constitutional Court stimulates and 
even demands legislation and thus substantially influences society as a whole160. 
Though, the judicial process of judicial review is not partisan in the sense that it is 
initiated by the lawmakers itself Judges do not initiate litigation; individual 
154 Wohrmann, p.12 
155 Rupp-v.Brtinneck, p.389 
156 Wohrmann, p.16 
157 Kommers, p.15 
158 Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elisabeth Prison, and Another (SE), excerpt in: 1995 
(112) SALJ p.44 
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litigants do16 1. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court can decide only on the 
question of constitutionality and not for example, on expediency. It can annul, but 
not usually redraft162.
Consequently, neither the executive nor the judiciary can apply the law further on 
and the regulation 1cfgs�its validity for citizens as well. General opinion quite 
clearly assume that a decision declaring a statute null and void has retroactive 
effect163. It follows that statutes with a constitutional "congenital defect" are 
considered never to have existed at all. This theory - once unconstitutional always 
unconstitutional- would, if followed strictly, bring chaos and justice at the same 
time164. Therefore the § 79 I BVerfGG tries to strike a balance between the 
principle of justice and the principles of legal security and predictability. It gives 
full retroactive effect only in one singular case: a person convicted under a 
criminal statute which is later declared void may demand a new trial. According to 
§ 79 II BVerfGG all other decisions or administrative acts which have become
final before the statute was declared void stand as they are: they may not be
enforced in the future, but there is no provision for damage sustained by anyone in
the past. Furthermore, the legislator is supposed to regulate the matter differently
and to pass another law, which complies with the constitutional requirements.
However, in a considerable number of occasions the German Constitutional Court
has given a so-called admonitory decision: Instead of declaring a statute
unconstitutional and void, the Court chooses to declare it for the time being still
constitutional, but announces at the same time, that the statute would become
unconstitutional in near future, unless the legislature should repeal or amend it. In
nearly all instances this appeal has been fruitful 165. 
Very similar to the German situation in this regard is the South Africafitl 
The judgements of the Court are based on the Constitution, which is the supreme 
law of the land. They guarantee the basic rights and freedoms of all persons. They 
are binding on all organs of government, including Parliament, the Presidency, the 
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police force, the army, the public service and all courts. This means that the Court 
has the power to declare an Act of Parliament null and void if it conflicts with the 
Constitution and to control executive action in the same way166 . 
All the same, questions of retrospectivity, prospectivity and the conditional 
suspension of orders of invalidity often present difficult choices 167, as is borne out 
by several judgements of the Constitutional Court 168 . An unqualified retrospective 
order could easily have undesirable consequences. Persons might act directly 
under the order to have convictions set aside without adequate judicial supervision 
or institute claims for damages169. / 
All courts competent to make declarations of constitutional invalidity have the 
power to make an appropriate order under section 172(1 )(b )(i) if such order, in 
the circumstances of a particular case, is "just or equitable" 170 . The real issue is 
whether, in the circumstances of this case, an order limiting the retrospectivity of 
the declaration of invalidity would indeed be just and equitable, on a proper 
construction of that concept in the context of the section and the Constitution as a 
whole171 . 
The principal features which have to be considered when contemplating the 
possibility of a retrospective order had been crisply summarised in the following 
passage 172: 
"Central to a consideration of the interests of justice in a particular case is that 
successful litigants should obtain the relief they seek. It is only when the interests 
of good government outweigh the interests of the individual litigants that the court 
will not grant relief to successful litigants. In principle too, the litigants before the 
court should not be singled out for the grant of relief, but relief should be afforded 
to all people who are in the same situation as the litigants (see US v Johnson 457 
US 537 (1982); Teague v Lane 489 US 288 (1989))173 . On the other hand, the 
166 Constitutional Court's Homepage 
167 S v Ntsele 1997 (11) BCLR 1543 (CC), para 13 
168 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC), paras.30-33 
169 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1517 (CC) para. 97 
170 S v Ntsele 1997 (11) BCLR 1543 (CC) para.12 
171 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 ( 12) 
BCLR 1517 (CC) para.87 B 
172 S v Ntsele 1997 (11) BCLR 1543 (CC), para.14 
173 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC), para.32 
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Court should be circumspect in exercising its powers under section 98(6)(a) of the 
interim Constitution so as to avoid unnecessary dislocation and uncertainty in the 
criminal justice process 174. 
As a general principle an order of invalidity should have no effect on cases which 
have been finalised prior to the date of the order of invalidity" 175. 
Indeed, it was not the intention in Ntsele's case to suggest that the tests for 
retrospectivity or non-retrospectivity were identical under the interim and the 
1996 Constitutions 176. Moreover, s. 172 ( 1) (b) of the final Constitution differs in
various respects from section 98 (5), (6) and (7) of the interim Constitution177. 
The criterion for the order which a court is competent to make under section 
172( 1 )(b) of the 1996 Constitution pursuant to a declaration of constitutional 
invalidity is that it must be "just and equitable". The criterion under section 98( 6) 
of the interim Constitution was "the interests of justice and good government". 
There has as yet been no comprehensive judgement of this Court on the meaning 
of "just and equitable" in section 172(1 )(b) of the 1996 Constitution, although it 
has already been alluded to 178. 
Some significant differences are the following: 
(a) In regard to a declaration of constitutional invalidity of a law or a provision
thereof, section 98( 6) of the interim Constitution regulated the consequences of 
such a declaration differently, depending on whether the law was in existence at 
the time the interim Constitution came into effect or whether it was passed 
thereafter. The 1996 Constitution draws no such distinction. 
(b) The effect of a declaration of invalidity (subject to the Constitutional Court's
power to order otherwise) is dealt with more · extensively under the interim 
Constitution in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of section 98(6). Under the 1996 
Constitution, and in the absence of a contrary order by a competent court, nothing 
more is provided other than that it has retrospective effect. 
174 S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC), para.43 
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( c) The power of a competent court to make an order deviating from that
provided for by the Constitution is formulated differently. Under the interim
Constitution the provisions of section 98(6)(a) and (b) were dominant, the
Constitutional Court being empowered to order otherwise than as provided in
these paragraphs "in the interests of justice and good government". Under the
1 �96 Constitution the dominant provision is section 172(1 )(b )(i) 179.
Despit�e differences the principle features are still 'tlirectly in point" under
the 1996 Constitution180; the interests of good government will always be an
important consideration in deciding whether a proposed order under the 1996
Constitution is "just and equitable", for justice and equity must also be evalua�
from the perspective of the state and the broad interests of society gen�rally181 . As
in Ntsele's case, it might ultimately be decisive as to what is just and equitable. At
the same time the test under the 1996 Constitution is a broader and more flexible
one, where the concept of the interests of good government is but one of many
possible factors to consider182. 
Although the long perpetuation of an unconstitutional scheme is admittedly
unfortunate, the Court must provide the opportunity for it. It is indeed 'in the
interest of justice"to remove the objectionable parts and replace them by ones that
are sound and realistic. To avoided fresh problems, that has to be both thorough
and thoughtful183 and therefore inevitably needs some time.
Consequently it is recognised by the Constitutional Court that, notwithstanding
the importance of the rights, time should be allowed to remedy the defect 184. A
typical result insofar is an order by the Court requiring legal remedy by Parliament
due at a certain date and the suspension of the declaration of invalidity up to this
date185 . In another 'case the Court held that the declaration shall invalidate any
179 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Others 
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) para.84 
180 
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application of the said section in any ( criminal) trial which commenced on or after 
a certain date186 or the Court orders that the unconstitutional act shall be invalid, 
/ 
t}-nd of no force and effect from the date ofthis judgement
187
. 
Notwithstanding, the Constitutional Court held that it has the responsibility of 
ensuring that the provisions of the Constitution are upheld and enforced. It should 
not be assumed that it will lightly grant the suspension of an order made by it 
declaring a statutory order to be invalid and of no force and effect, or if it does so, 
that it will allow more time than is necessary for the defect in the legislation to be 
cured 188 . It is the duty of the Minister responsible for the administration of the
statute, who wishes to ask an order of invalidity to be suspended to place 
sufficient information before the Court to justify the making of such an order, and 
to show the time that will be needed to remedy the defect in the legislation 189 .
Although initially there was considerable scepticism about the Constitutional 
Court, recent findings by the Court have created a stronger perception of its 
independence190 .
However, both in Germany and in South Africa nearly all the Constitutional 
Courts' rulings have considerable political implications which often interfere with 
the law-making process. 
ill. The Role of the Judges 
It is contended, that the most important factor determining interpretation is the 
composition of the adjudicating court, since the orientation of individual judges 
has a profound effect on their interpretation of such issues as which right to give 
superior weight to and how various rights ought to be balanced191 . It might be 
debatable whether it is actually the most important factor, however, it is in any 
case a very important one, as the weighing of constitutional values, competing for 
hierarchical status, is influenced inter alia by the personal values to which the 
186 S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC), para.46 
187 Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security 
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adjudicating judges subscribe 192. It is inevitable that judges will interpret and apply 
the Constitution according to their own subjective insights193 . 
Therefore the conception of the Constitutional Courts in Germany and South 
Africa is also dependent on the role of their judges. Hence, it shall be examined 
how the appointment procedure is provided for and what status is assigned to the 
judges. 
Like in all previous chapters, the German situation shall be described first and then 
the South African compared to that. 
1. The Procedure of Appointment 
The question of who is appointed to a Constitutional Court is clearly critical, since 
individual judges play a large part in determining the decisions that will emanate 
from that court194. Who the judges are and the manner in which they are 'appointed 
is highly relevant to the outcome of a decision195 . Of particular importance is, 
hence, who actually deter~ines the decisive members of the Court and how the 
procedure works. 
Because of the paramount and even political significance of the Federal 
Constitutional Court the election of the judges is also an important political 
matter196. 
The Federal Constitutional Court shall have a democratic legitimisation197. As 
already mentioned, Art. 94 I GG provides that half of the judges shall be elected by 
the Bundestag and the other half by the Bundesrat. §§ 5 et seq. BVerfGG set out 
the carrying out in detail and determine a complicated election procedure198. 
According to§ 5 I BVerfGG one of the two electoral organs (electoral committee 
of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) shall elect one federal judge and three other 
judges, whereas the other electoral organ elects two federal judges and two other 
judges for each panel. The legislator did not determine, which electoral organ 
192 Sarkin, p.137 
193 Froneman, p.9 
194 Sarkin, p.136 
195 Sarkin, p.149 
196 Degenhardt, s.no.488 
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undertakes which election. Meanwhile the Bundesrat is responsible for the first 
named election and the Bundestag for the latter one 199. On the other hand, as § 9 I 
BVerfGG sets out, the election of the Constitutional Court's President and Vice-
President alternates between the two electoral organs. 
Whereas pursuant to§ 7 BVerfGG the Bundesrat elects directly, for the 
Bundestag an indirect election procedure is provided (cf. § 6 I BVerfGG). § 6 II 
lays down that the Bundestag has to elect a twelve-man electoral committee, 
which shall proportionally represent the groups in parliament. 
The judges to be elected need a supporting vote of two thirds (cf. §§ 6 V and 7 
BVerfGG). This dependence on high majorities in the electoral bodies leads to 
decisions based on consensus between the dominating parties in the political 
spectrum, and attempts to achieve parity200. In practice the political parties agree 
on arrangements corresponding to proportional representation201, or, like others 
put it, "the selection procedure can be reduced to a matter of haggling"202 . 
However, if the election of a judge fails, the electoral organs have to request the 
Court to propose candidates (cf. § 7a I BVerfGG). For the election of just one 
judge the Court has to submit a list of three candidates, and for the election of 
more judges the Court shall propose twice as many candidates as needed. Though, 
the electoral organs are not obliged to follow the Court's proposals. Twice of five 
times, when the Constitutional Court had to make proposals, other judges than 
these proposed by the Constitutional Court were in the end elected203 . 
This described election procedure is the Parliament's only possibility to influence 
the court directly. Neither Parliament nor any other body can remove a judge from 
the bench204 . 
The appointment procedure for the judges at the South African Constitutional 
Court is prescribed in the Constitution; it contains a particular section dealing with 
the appointment of judicial officers, s.174 of the SA-Constitution. Subs.3 provides 
199 Umbach/ Clemens,§ 5 s.no.8 
200 Hase/ Ruete, p.269 
201 Degenhardt, s.no.48$ 
202 Brinkmann, p.91 
203 Umbach/ Clemens,§ 7a s.no.36 
204 Brinkmann, p.102 
------
55 
that the President as head of the national executive appoints the President and 
Deputy President of the Constitutional Court, after consultations with the Judicial 
Service Commission and the leaders of parties represented in the National 
Assembly. 
The Working Draft reveals a difference of opinion about who should appoint the 
judges - the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission or the 
President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. In the latter 
case, it would mean that "political appointments" could occur much more 
·1 205 eas1 y 
What exactly "after consultations" means, is subject to interpretation. In contrast 
to the Interim Constitution the term is not defined any further. Whereas the 
Interim Constitution had provided that "in consultation with' means that 
consensus must have been reached with the other functionary before a valid 
decision could be taken, the term "after consultatio�as defined as the duty to 
consult the other functionary but that the final decision rests with the functionary 
that made the decision in the first place. According to the latter one can conclude 
that the President is not bound by the recommendations given by the Judicial 
Service Commission. He or she is merely obliged to consult the commission in 
good faith206 .
This conclusion is underlined by the fact that the judges of all other courts are 
appointed by the President "on the advice" of the Judicial Service Commission 
(s.174 (6) of the SA-Constitution). The term "in advice of' has a clearly 
understood meaning in constitutional law. In contrast to the appointment of the 
President and Deputy President of the Constitutional Court the President must 
follow the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. It is submitted in this regard 
that he has no discretion207.
Hence, if it were intended to give the Judicial Service Commission more 
significance in regard to the appointment of the President and Deputy President of 
the Constitutional Court, it would have been expressed correspondingly. 
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The other judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the President as 
well. As s.174 ( 4) of the SA-Constitution sets out, the President has to consult the 
Court's President and also the leaders of all parties represented in the National 
Assembly for their appointment. 
However, the Judicial Service Commission has considerable influence on the 
President's choice and plays an important role in determining the judges of the 
Constitutional Court. Crucially, the Commission is and will in future be composed 
largely of members of the legal profession208, it lacks a real representation of the 
people. Thus, the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court is increasingly 
becoming a matter of public concern. The appointment of Mr Justice Tollie 
Madala was for example an event which generated much debate in the press209 .
Subs. 4 (a), (b ), and ( c) describe in detail a three-step-procedurerof co-operation
r,"'-�\ 
between the President and the Commission. All the same, th�ecision rests 
with the President: 
Firstly the President has to choose the judges he wants to appoint out of a list 
prepared by the Judicial Service Commission, which contains three more 
candidates than are to be appointed. If he does not find enough acceptable 
candidates, he must indeed give reasons for his rejection of candidates, but then 
the Judicial Service Commission again has to submit a supplemented list. Out of 
this list the President finally has to appoint the missing judges and if any judge is 
absent for a long period or a vacancy arises, an acting judge may be appointed by 
the President of the Republic on a temporary basis. 
To sum up, the German judges are determined by the vote of politicians 
representing the people in parliament. The South African judges, in contrast, are 
chosen by the President as head of the executive in - more or less intensive - co- �·i
. 
operation · wit · h a comm · ssion · cons1stmg · mai ·n1 y o fl ega 1 c-: pro1ess1ona ·' I s.ir
2. The Prerequisites of Being a Constitutional Judge and 
 their Status 
Under this heading it shall be monitored on the parameters which qualify someone 
to be a constitutional judge and their position. 
208 Sarkin, p.136 
209 Hlophe, p.22 
57 
In Germany the judges either have been a federal judge before their appointment 
to the Federal Constitutional Court, or they belong to the group of other 
members. Other members are ordinary judges of other courts210, who, according 
to § 3 I BVerfGG, have to be older than 40 years of age, eligible for the 
Bundestag and must have declared in writing to be prepared to become judge at 
the Federal Constitutional Court. 
According to § 4 I, III B V erfGG a judge is elected for a 12 years term of office, if 
he (or she) does not turn 68 during this period. § 4 II BVerfGG excludes the 
possibility of re-election to ensure the independence of the judges211 . All the same, 
the term of office of the individual judges runs over twelve years. That means, the 
judges remain in office for a longer time than the electing parliament is in office, 
so it may be doubtful whether the judges are representatives of the actually 
existing ~arliament212. 
While in office they may not belong to the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the Federal 
Government, nor any corresponding organs of a Land. Their functions as a judge 
preclude any other professional occupation except that of teaching law at a 
German university. 
It is noteworthy that nearly all judges have a party affiliation213 , although the 
unequivocal command of Art.97 I GG that the judges be independent and subject 
only to law214. 
The Grundgesetz uses the term law (lex) in the sense of both statutory law and 
right or justice215 . Hence, the judges might even decide on a basis beyond 
statutory law. 
Besides that, the independence of the constitutional judges is so far-reaching that 
there is no provision for a removal from the bench216 . Thus, whereas the 
parliament and the government are exposed to the control by the people, at least 
210 v.Munch - Meyer, art.94 s.no.12 
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so far as they must be re-elected when aiming to remain in office, the judges are 
not responsible to the people at all217. 
S.174 (5) of the SA-Constitution provides that at least four members of the 
Constitutional Court must be persons who were judges at the time they were 
appointed to the Constitutional Court. S.176 (1) of the SA-Constitution 
determines that a judge is only eligible for the Constitutional Court once for a term 
of 12 years, and fixes the age for retirement at 70 years. They are all 
independent218, but not·unremovable: S.177 of the SA-Constitution sets out 
certain conditions for removing a judge from the bench. 
The judges' duty is to uphold the law and the Constitution, which they must apply 
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice219. 
For compliance with the Court's function as a guardian of the constitution it is 
important that the judges who serve in the Constitutional Court should be 
politically impartiaI220 . 
In terms of s.35 interim Constitution respectively s.39 (1) (a) of the SA-
Constitution the courts and specifically the judges are cast in the additional role of 
social engineers, social and legal philosophers in order to promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality221 . 
The judges are instruments that must put law into effect. the activity of judges will 
not only be confined to the interpretation of existing laws, but they are obliged to 
engage in the more creative activity in generating new laws in terms of s. 3 5 
interim Constitution respectively s.39 (1) (a) of the SA-Constitution. This 
constitutional provision gives judges an almost plenipotentiary judicial authority to 
decide according to a sense of natural justice; "equity", "jus naturale", "aequitas" 
all being enshrined in the Constitution222 . 
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Hence, the independence of the judges is highlighted in Germany as well as in 
South Africa by similar provisions. Not only the long but single term of 12 years in 
office but also the explicit orders to the judges not only to apply statutory law, 
grants them an extraordinary authority. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Federal Constitutional Court has gained a solid reputation: Political 
discussion in Germany is no longer concerned with the question of whether or not 
there should be a constitutional jurisdiction at all, but how the Federal 
Constitutional Court should exercise its comprehensive powers within the political 
system, i.e. the interplay of the Court with other governmental institutions223 . 
It appears from the attitudinal patterns of the opinion-leaders that the South 
African Constitutional Court also has built up a high degree of legitimacy over a 
short period224 . 
However, whether the conceptions of the Constitutional Courts of Germany and 
South Africa have provided for appropriate measures to resolve the tension 
between law and politics, remains highly questionable. The emphasised 
independence of the judges in both states in connection with the inevitable political 
implications of the application and interpretation of constitutional law seem rather 
to promote than to prevent the Courts' interference in politics. Party affiliations 
are neither in Germany nor in South Africa seen as incompatible with the 
lG,I.J \:;, 
profession as a constitutional judge. Indeed, it is contended that judicial officers 
_/\., 
are accountable for their actions by taking personal moral responsibility for their . 
decisions225 . However, while it sounds very idealistic, it is realistically considered / 
rather doubtful, whether this is a sufficient and reliable measure. · / 
All the same, one could doubt, whether there is in fact a tension between law and 
politics. Indeed, a court which has to apply constitutional law is always exposed to 
criticism from one side or another. Whatever a court called upon to interpret a 
written constitution may decide, it will be exposed to criticism from the Ildft, for 
( 
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being reactionary and perpetuating out-of-date ideologies, or to criticism from the 
• Right, for being subservient to the Government of the day
226
.
However, positively approached one could contend that the judicialisation of
politics is not the worst thing; maybe it takes out some irrational aspects of
politics and helps to focus on the interests of justice rather than those of lobbies.
Though, if one follows this approach, the judges should be determined to take the
representation of the people into account. That cannot be guaranteed by a body
like the Judicial Service Commission in South Africa, but rather by an election
procedure of the legislature like in Germany.
On the other hand the Constitutional Courts' relation to the legislature in 
particular is still a crucial one. In theory the Constitutional Court could spoil every 
legislation by declaring it unconstitutional. The jurisdiction for legal review both in 
Germany and South Africa is comprehensive. Hence, the Courts could develop 
rath�r to masters than guardians of the Constitution. 
In Germany the Parliament has at least an influence and control to a certain degree 
by electing the judges and creating the legal basis for the Court. South Africa's 
Constitutional Court, however, is established constitutionally and ruled mainly by 
itself Though, the Court as an institution does not have the independence the 
German Court has: It cannot be seen as an independent organ of state, but is 
bound to the Department of Justice and the executive power by the fact, that the 
President appoints the judges. All the same, the President is obliged to co-operate 
with a neutral body of law experts, who, indeed, do not represent the people. 
Moreover, the South African Court is not separated from the courts' structure and 
has not the exclusive power to interpret the Constitution. 
In fact, in Germany as well as in South Africa there are means to keep the 
Constitutional Courts' power under control. 
Moreover, an important restriction of the Courts' power is the lack of 
enforcement measures; Constitutional Courts cannot enforce their decisions but. 
must rely on convincing others
227
. Hence, if the Court permanently overstepped its 
226 Brinkmann, p.83 with further references 
227 Brinkmann, p.103; Mahomed in 1998 SALJ p 111 
. ) 
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powers, it would be faced with the only possible sanction: loss of its authority. By 
expanding its power too far, any institution can undermine its influence228 . 
Additionally, substantive accountability results from the fact that judicial decisions 
are open to public debate and academic criticism229.
Therefore, the convincing power is to a great extent based on a solid reputation 
and authority. Apparently, with both the Constitutional Courts of Germany and 





COMMENTS ON THE MINOR DISSERTATION OF THOMAS REHM 
1. STYLE
The style used in the footnotes {no italics, almost note style) is somewhat 
strange. It is however fairly consistently used. Sometimes reference is made 
to a case but not to the relevant paragraph { see footnotes 8 and 11 ). 
2. LANGUAGE
I appreciate that the candidate's first language is not English, but the 
language is generally not up to standard. The candidate should have taken 
much more time to 'write' the dissertation. 
3. STRUCTURE
The structure itself is perhaps not the problem, but the dissertation does not 
flow nicely to the conclusion. I think the problem is that it is not possible to 
look at the constitutional and legislative provisions relating to jurisdiction etc 
and.then to determine how influential a court is in the political system. It is to 
look at the physical characteristics of a person and then to predict how fast he 
or she can run. It does not work like that. In order to determine the influence 
of the court one must look at the actual decisions, the way they have been ( or 
not been) implemented. This is a task that Mr Rehm does not undertake. 
4. CONTENT
I quite liked the idea of distinguishing between Concourt matters dealt with in 
the Constitution, in legislation and then in the rules of the Court itself. But I do 
not think that it says much about the independence of a Court. It is in any 
event difficult to compare the FCC with the SA Concourt in this way because 
the former is part of a codified system. There was no attempt to come to grips 
with the 'inherent' jurisdiction of superior courts in a common law system such 
as South Africa. 
I didn't understand the part dealing with the 'status' of the courts. Apart 
from the points about the budget and the links to the Department of Justice, 
the arguments seem extremely formalistic. Mr Rehm comes close to drawing 
conclusions about status, competence and power from a title. It is almost like 
drawing conclusions about a person's competence from his or her title, which, 
as Mr Rehm will know, is an extremely dangerous thing to do! 
There is a difference, at least in our system, between provisions 
dealing with jurisdiction and those dealing with referral and appeal. This is not 
always kept in mind. See top of page 24: while they are relevant to jurisdiction 
one cannot determine a court's jurisdiction with reference to the referral 
provisions. 
Interestingly enough, we borrowed the German system of referral in 
cases of concrete review. Because this did not work, the referrals were largely 
rejected in the 1996 Constitution in favour of a system of appeals. Perhaps Mr 
Rehm cold have considered why the referral system failed in SA and whether 
it js working in Germany. 
The question of the Concourt's jurisdiction and the compatibility of 
international law with domestic law is an interesting one. Unfortunately Mr 
Rehm does not make enough of it. Is this a constitutional issue? 
Generally, why is there such a discrepancy between the number of 
cases pending before the FCC and the number of decisions? Can they be that 
far behind? 
In order to determine who may bring a dispute between organs of state 
to the Constitutional Court one must look at the rules of the Court, the rules 
relating to standing, the principle of co-operative government. This part of the 
dissertation is somewhat superficial. 
I am not sure that if something is dealt with in legislation, such as 
elections, it ceases to be a 'constitutional •ssue'. I t  would very much depend 
on the dispute. 
The closest thing we have to the constitutional complaint is not direct 
access, but the appeal. This part of the dissertation is, in my view, confused. 
Despite the FCC's objections, the constitutional complaint is a sort of appeal.  
am not sure whether there is a provision similar to direct access in Germany   
somehow recall that there .is something about prisoners who may lodge a 
complaint directly with the FCC. In this part of the dissertation Mr Rehm is 
unfortunately comparing apples with pears. 
Concerning the impact of the Courts' decisions, .I think that both the 
FCC and the SAConcourt often deliberately opt for the least intrusive remedy. 
Nevertheless the effects of the Courts' decisions are far-reaching - think 
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